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The Past, Present and Future of Auer Deference:
Mead, Form and Function in Judicial Review of
Agency Interpretations of Regulations
Michael P. Healy*
1.

INTRODUCTION

The law of judicial review of agency legal interpretations has
undergone an important reshaping as a consequence of the Supreme
Court decision in United States v. Mead Corp. 1 That decision and the
important follow-on decision in National Cable & Telecommunications
Ass 'n v. Brand X Internet Servicei have changed the understanding of
the Court's landmark 1984 decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. 3 Chevron defined a new era of judicial
deference to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute,4 but the
Chevron era has itself been transformed. s
These legal developments had seemed to have little consequential
impact on a related legal doctrine that is also at the center of the
relationship between courts and agencies. Regulations have come to
provide the applicable source of public law in an increasing number of
cases and now occupy a place in administrative law that is comparable to
the place of statutes. 6 Regulations share an important characteristic with
• Wendell H. Ford Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. J.D., 1984,
University of Pennsylvania; B.A., 1978 Williams College. The author thanks Kent Bamett and
Collin Schueler for reviewing an earlier draft of this article. The author is responsible for any errors.
1. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). The significance of Mead and its impact on agency interpretations of
statutes are addressed in Michael P. Healy, Reconciling Chevron, Mead, and the Review of Agency
Discretion: Source ofLaw and the Standards ofJudicial Review, 19 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1 (2011).
2. 545 U.S. 967 (2005). See generally Healy, supra note 1, at 18-25 (discussing Mead and
BrandX).
3. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See generally Healy, supra note 1, at 15-18 (discussing the Chevron
decision).
4. See Healy, supra note 1, at 15-18.
5. See id. at 2.
6. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 612,614--15 (1996) ("[R]egulations frequently
playa more direct role than statutes in defining the public's legal rights and obligations." (footnote
omitted)); Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, III MICH. L. REv. 355, 356-57 (2012) ("The
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statutes: both are often ambiguous. 7 The standard that applies when a
court reviews an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous regulation had
been initially defined by Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. 8- a
decision that predated the Administrative Procedure Act CAPA).9 This
early decision had been accepted wholeheartedly by the Court after
Chevron, most notably in Auer v. Robbins.IO The resulting black-letter
law-that courts will defer to any reasonable agency interpretation of its
own regulations-had seemed to have exactly the same effect as
Chevron deference. 11 Because of the significance of regulations in
administrative law, this rule of deference has played a critical role in
defining the relationship between courts and agencies. 12
This tidy rule of deference has now come to be far less tidy and
secure as a result of a quintet of recent Supreme Court decisions. These

decisions-Gonzales v. Oregon,13 Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska

ascendance of statutory interpretation occurred, however, as regulations issued by administrative
agencies eclipsed statutes as sources of law. With the rise of regulations, lawyers and judges now
routinely confront questions of interpretation on this next frontier-that is, the interpretation of
regulations themselves." (footnote omitted»; id. at' 365 ("In the 1960s and 1970s, agencies
increasingly turned to rulemaking to implement their statutory powers. Agency reliance on
rulemaking has persisted. Today, the majority of agencies issue their most significant policies
through notice-and-comment rulemaking." (footnotes omitted»; see also id. at 357 ("While all agree
that regulations are primary sources oflaw, strikingly little attention has been devoted to the method
of their interpretation. ").
7. See Stack, supra note 6, at 365-66 ("With the rise of rulemaking, it is hard to deny a naive
expectation ... that agency regulations would resolve legal ambiguities, not create them. To be
sure, many regulations clarifY legal obligations. But regulations are not unique among legal sources
for their lack of ambiguity or the obviousness of their interpretation. At times, regulations replicate
statutory ambiguities; in other instances, they create their own. Changed and unforeseen
circumstances also unsettle the interpretation of regulations that had appeared to be clear." (footnotes
omitted».
8. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
9. The APA was enacted in 1946. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404,60 Stat.
237 (1946) (codified as amended in 5 U.S.C.).
10. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). See infra notes 78-129 and accompanying text (discussing Seminole
Rock deference after Chevron).
II. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339-40 (2013) (Scalia, 1., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("In practice, Auer deference is Chevron deference applied to
regulations rather than statutes. The agency's interpretation will be accepted if, though not the
fairest reading of the regulation, it is a plausible reading-within the scope of the ambiguity that the
regulation contains." (citation omitted».
12. See id. at 1339 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) ("The issue is a basic one going to the heart of
administrative law. Questions of Seminole Rock and Auer deference arise as a matter of course on a
regular basis."); Manning, supra note 6, at 615 ("Because agency rules that comply with specified
procedural formalities bind with the force of statutes, Seminole Rock has a significant impact on the
public's legal rights and obligations." (footnote omitted».
13. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
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Conservation Council,'4 Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone
CO.,15 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,16 and Decker v.
Northwest Environmental Defense Center '7-have had a cumulative
effect on Auer deference that resembles the impact that Mead has had on
Chevron deference. These cases reveal a Court that has come to view
Auer deference as either less deferential than or equivalent to Chevron
deference, and subject to a test for the (uncertain) standard's
applicability. 18 The Court is, however, reshaping this law of deference
with little apparent understanding of the impact of its decisions.
Moreover, the Court has provided little rationale for its changes in the
law.
This article will assess this developing, but under-analyzed,'9 area of
administrative law. The first part describes the past of the long-accepted
rule of deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations. 20
The second part discusses the Court's recent changes in its approach to
the traditional rule of deference, highlighting the degree to which the
Court is now less willing to defer to an agency's interpretation of its own
regulations. 21
The final part of the article discusses the future of deference in this
context and seeks to accommodate the functional and formal reasons for
a rule of deference. 22 In short, this part presents a theoretical rationale
for a new non-deferential standard of review.

14.
15.
16.
17.

557
131
132
133

U.s. 261 (2009).
S. Ct. 2254 (2011).
S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
18. See infra notes 236--47 and accompanying text.
19. See Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock's Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1449, 1503-04 (2011) ("Federal judges and administrative law scholars continue to wrestle
with the appropriate scope of Chevron's domain. Especially in the wake of Mead, this issue has
generated more controversy, and more sophisticated scholarly commentary, than perhaps any other
single doctrinal problem in administrative law. It is therefore somewhat surprising that no
comparable discussion has taken place about the appropriate domain of Seminole Rock, Chevron's
vitally important but sometimes neglected counterpart. "); id. at 1504 ("The comparative neglect of
questions regarding Seminole Rock's domain risks incoherence, unpredictability, and erosion of
important safeguards against administrative arbitrariness."); Manning, supra note 6, at 614
("Seminole Rock deference . . . has long been one of the least worried-about principles of
administrative law.").
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part N.
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II. THE UNDERTHEORIZED PAST OF THE RULE OF DEFERENCE TO AN
AGENCY'S INTERPRETATION OF ITS OwN REGULATIONS

A. The Simple Point ofBeginning: Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand

Co.23
Seminole Rock involved the administration of price controls during
World War 11.24 The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 had
delegated to the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration the
authority to promulgate regulations to implement price controls. 25 The
issue was whether the seller of crushed stone could sell its product for a
maximum of $1.50 per ton or $0.60 per ton based on its sale price during
the month of March 1942.26 The higher price was the amount charged
for crushed stone ordered, but not delivered, during that month, while the
lower price was paid for crushed stone that was actually delivered during
the month.27
The court of appeals concluded that the agency had committed a
legal error when it decided that $0.60 was the maximum permissible
price. 28 The court stated its view that, when a court reviews an agency's
interpretation of a statute or its regulations, the court employs the same
review standard: "In order to be binding upon and enforceable by the
courts, administrative interpretations either of the law or regulations
having the force and effect of law must be in harmony with and tend to
effectuate the cardinal purposes of the law, and may not be
unreasonable." 29
The court then concluded that the agency's
interpretation was both "unreasonable and [] antagonistic to the letter and
spirit of the Act."30
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and provided,
without any analytic explanation,31 a famous and long-effective standard
23. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
24. Id. at 411.
25. See id. at 412.
26. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 145 F.2d 482, 484 (5th Cir. 1944), rev'd, 325
U.S. 410 (1945).
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. Id. (footnote omitted).
30. Id. at 485.
31. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1340 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("Our cases have not put forward a persuasive justification for Auer
deference. The first case to apply it, Seminole Rock, offered no justification whatever-just the ipse
dixit that 'the administrative interpretation .. . becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly
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for reviewing agency interpretations of its regulations:
Since [the problem in this case] involves an interpretation of an
administrative regulation a court must necessarily look to the
administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the
words used is in doubt. The intention of Congress or the principles of
the Constitution in some situations may be relevant in the first instance
in choosing between various constructions. But the ultimate criterion
is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling
weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.32

The strong rule of deference described by the Court is, however,
undercut by the analysis that follows the Court's statement of the rule.
The Court begins its analysis by quoting the definition that the regulation
provided for the key legal term:
'Highest price charged during March, 1942' means
(i) The highest price which the seller charged to a purchaser of the
same class for delivery of the article or material during March, 1942; or
(ii) If the seller made no such delivery during March, 1942, such
seller's highest offering price to a purchaser of the same class for
delivery of the article or material during that month; or
(iii) If the seller made no such delivery and had no such offering price
to a purchaser of the same class during March, 1942, the highest price
charged by the seller during March, 1942, to a purchaser of a different
class, adjusted to reflect the seller's customary differential between the
two classes of purchasers[.] 3 3
The Court then presented what it viewed as the "evident" meaning of
this definition: "The facts of each case must first be tested by rule (i);
only if that rule is inapplicable may rule (ii) be utilized; and only if both
rules (i) and (ii) are inapplicable is rule (iii) controlling." 3 4

erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."' (citation omitted)); Manning, supra note 6, at 619
("[Tihe Court in Seminole Rock did not offer any detailed rationale for binding deference.");
Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 19, at 1454 ("The Seminole Rock Court offered no explanation
whatsoever-nor even a citation to any other authority-for its conclusion that a reviewing court
must uphold an administrative interpretation of a regulation that is not clearly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation." (footnote omitted)).
32. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,413-14 (1945) (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 414 (quoting § 1499.163(a)(2)).
34. Id. at 415.
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Based on this "evident" meaning of the definition, the Court
concluded that there was a "clear[]" rather than ambiguous meaning of
the price regulation that followed from the Court's own close reading of
the text:
As we read the regulation, however, rule [if clearly applies to the
facts of this case, making 60 cents per ton the ceiling price for
respondent's crushed stone. The regulation recognizes the fact that
more than one meaning may be attached to the phrase 'highest price
charged during March, 1942.' The phrase might be construed to mean
only the actual charges or sales made during March, regardless of the
delivery dates. Or it might refer only to the charges made for actual
delivery in March. Whatever may be the variety of meanings,
however, rule (i) adopts the highest price which the seller 'charged for
delivery' of an article during March, 1942. The essential element
bringing the rule into operation is thus the fact of delivery during
March. If delivery occurs during that period the highest price charged
for such delivery becomes the ceiling price. Nothing is said concerning
the time when the charge or sale giving rise to the delivery occurs. One
may make a sale or charge in October relative to an article which is
actually delivered in March and still be said to have 'charged for
delivery during March.' We can only conclude, therefore, that for
purposes of rule (i) the highest price charged for an article delivered
during March, 1942, is the seller's ceiling price regardless of the time
when the sale or charge was made.35
The Court's close textual analysis of the regulatory definition
continued when it stated:
This conclusion is further bome out by the fact that rule [ii]
becomes applicable only where 'the seller made no such delivery
during March, 1942,' as contemplated by rule (i). The absence of a
delivery, rather than the absence of both a charge and a delivery during
March, is necessary to make rule (i) ineffective, thereby indicating that
the factor of delivery is the essence of rule (i).36
The Court's textual analysis of the regulation ended with its
conclusion:
It is apparent, moreover, that the delivery must be an actual instead of a
constructive one. Section 1499.20(d) of General Maximum Price
Regulation, incorporated by reference into Maximum Price Regulation
No. 188 by Section 1499.151, defines the word 'delivered' as meaning
'received by the purchaser or by any carrier for shipment to the
35. Id at 415-16 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
36. Id at 416.
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purchaser' during March, 1942. Thus an article is not 'delivered' to a
purchaser during March because of the existence of an executory
contract under which no shipments are actually made to him during that
month. In short, the Administrator in rule (i) was concerned with what
actually was delivered, not with what might have been delivered.37
Only after this extensive analysis of the regulatory text does the
Court turn its attention to the agency's own interpretation of the
regulation. The Court quoted two examples of the agency's construction
of the regulation3 8 and referred as well to the fact that "the Administrator
has stated that this position has uniformly been taken by the Office of
Price Administration in the countless explanations and interpretations
given to inquirers affected by this type of maximum price
determination."39
Given the nature of its analysis, it is not surprising that the Court
explained its holding in the case as follows:
Our reading of the language of Section 1499.163(a)(2) of Maximum
Price Regulation No. 188 and the consistent administrative
interpretation of the phrase 'highest price charged during March, 1942'
thus compel the conclusion that respondent's highest price charged
during March for crushed stone was 60 cents per ton, since that was the
highest price charged for stone actually delivered during that month.
The two courts below erred in their interpretation 40
of this regulation and
the judgment below must accordingly be reversed.
In short, although Seminole Rock has become well known to
administrative lawyers for establishing the rule that a court must defer to
an agency's reasonable interpretation of its own regulations,4 1 that rule of
deference did not determine the result in the case. The Court itself
construed the regulation and found that it provided a clear answer to the
legal question. The Court used the agency's interpretations only as a
make weight, bolstering its own reading of the regulations. Applying
modem terminology to the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Rock,

37. Id. at 416-17.
38. Id. at 417.
39. Id. at 417-18.
40. Id. at 418 (footnote omitted).
41. See, e.g., Stack, supra note 6, at 368 (describing "the well-established doctrine, attributed to
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. and Auer v. Robbins, that an agency's construction of its own
regulation is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation" (footnotes
omitted) (quotation marks omitted)).
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one might say that the Court said Chevron step-two deference applied 42
to its review of the agency interpretation. The Court then concluded that
the meaning of the regulation was clear-analogous to a Chevron stepone decision.4 3 The agency's interpretation was actually insignificant to
the Court's interpretation of the regulation's text, viewed as
unambiguous by the Court. The agency would have had to amend its
regulations before it could have interpreted them as Seminole Rock had
advocated.
Decisions by the Supreme Court in the years after Seminole Rock,
and prior to the 1984 Chevron decision, applied the deferential standard
that the Court had identified when reviewing agency interpretations of
regulations. The Court's analysis in two of these cases, decided after the
enactment in 1946 of the APA," indicated that that statute had no effect
on the Court's understanding of the proper review standard. In Power
ReactorDevelopment Co. v. InternationalUnion ofElectrical,Radio and
Machine Workers,45 the Court considered the question: "whether the
[Atomic Energy] Commission, in issuing a permit for the construction of
a facility which will utilize nuclear materials . . . must make the same

definitive finding of safety of operation as it admittedly will have to
make before it licenses actual operation of the facility."4 6 The Court
concluded that the statute was ambiguous regarding this question. 47 The
Court accordingly turned to the regulations to decide the legal question.48
The Court's analytic method is then similar to its method in Seminole
Rock.4 9 The Court first closely read the text of the regulation and
concluded that its meaning was clear:
We think the great weight of the argument supports the position . .. that
42. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
("[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.").
43. See id. at 842-43 ("First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.").
See generally Healy, supranote 1, at 15-18.
44. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended in 5 U.S.C.).
45. 367 U.S. 396 (1961).
46. Id at 398.
47. Id. at 406 ("There is nothing on the face of either §182 or § 185 which tells us what safety
findings must be made before this preliminary step [of issuing a construction permit] is taken. We
know, however, from §104, subd. b that some such finding must be made.").
48. See id. at 406-08.
49. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
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Reg. 50.35 permits the Commission to defer a definitive safety finding
until operation is actually licensed. The words of the regulation
themselves certainly lean strongly in that direction. The first finding is
to be made, by definition, on the basis of incomplete information, and
concerns only the 'general type' of reactor proposed. The second
finding is phrased unequivocally in terms of 'reasonable assurance,'
while the first speaks more tentatively of 'information sufficient to
provide reasonable assurance.' The Commission, furthermore, had
good reason to make this distinction. For nuclear reactors are fastdeveloping and fast-changing. What is up to date now may not,
probably will not, be as acceptable tomorrow. Problems which seem
insuperable now may be solved tomorrow, perhaps in the very process
of construction itself. 50
Having presented its understanding of the regulatory text, the Court
added the gloss of deference, stating the rule of deference as uniformly
applicable to an agency interpretation of its regulation and its statute:
"We see no reason why we should not accord to the Commission's
interpretation of its own regulation and governing statute that respect
which is customarily given to a practical administrative construction of a
disputed provision."5 1 The Court then opined that according deference to
Its
the Commission was "particularly" appropriate in this case.
reasoning in this regard was notable. First, the Court believed that "the
administrative practice at stake involves a contemporaneous construction
of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its
machinery in motion; of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly
while they are yet untried and new." 52 This language reinforces that the
Court saw deference to agency interpretations of regulations as
equivalent to agency interpretations of statutes. The reasoning also
reflects the traditional judicial view of the expertise of agencies and the
strong functional rationale for deference.
This reasoning, of course,
makes no distinction based on the source of the law being interpreted: the
statute is Congress-made law, while the regulation is agency-made law.
This latter source of law distinction is critical to the theory of deference
50. Power ReactorDev., 367 U.S. at 407-08.
51. Id at 408. This statement of the rule of deference is very similar to the statement of the rule
of deference by the court of appeals in Seminole Rock. See supra text accompanying note 29.
52. Id. (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
53. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 19, at 1459 ("The main pragmatic arguments in
favor of deferring to an agency's construction of its own regulation are clear and familiar. First and
foremost, such deference may promote competent and efficient administration of complex
government programs. Agencies, according to a widely held and plausible view, often possess
technical expertise that courts lack-both with respect to the subject matter and how different parts
ofa complicated regulatory scheme fit together.").
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in modem administrative law.5 4
The Court's final argument on why deference was "particularly"
appropriate in this case was that the statute had not been amended after
the congressional committee had been informed of the agency's
interpretation. The Court commented that the agency's construction:
has time and again been brought to the attention of the Joint Committee
of Congress on Atomic Energy, which under § 202 of the Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2252, has a special duty during each session of Congress 'to
conduct hearings in either open or executive session for the purpose of
receiving information concerning the development, growth, and state of
the atomic energy industry,' and to oversee the operations of the AEC.
No change in this procedure has ever been suggested by the
Committee, although it has on occasion been critical of other aspects of
the PRDC proceedings not before us. It may often be shaky business to
attribute significance to the inaction of Congress, but under these
circumstances, and considering especially the peculiar responsibility
and place of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in the statutory
scheme, we think it fair to read this history as a de facto acquiescence
in and ratification of the Commission's licensing procedure by
Congress. This same procedure has been used in each of the nine
instances in which the Commission has granted a provisional
construction permit for a developmental nuclear power reactor, and we
hold that it was properly used in this case.
This rationale reinforces the Court's view that the same rule of
deference applies because the Court saw no legal difference between an
agency's interpretation of a statute and of its regulations. The Court's
rationale here, however, is anachronistic in two respects. First, the
Court's expressed willingness to rely on a congressional committee's
acquiescence is in tension with the separation of powers principles
defined by INS v. Chadha.6 A congressional committee should not have
the power to shape an agency's understanding of a previously enacted
statute. Second, the Court has again demeaned the significance of the
source of law to our understanding of deference. If Congress has
delegated lawmaking power to an agency, the agency has the power to
Congress has
exercise that authority independently of Congress.
authority only to make, but not to execute, the laws, and it makes law
only by enacting statutes.57
54.
55.
56.
57.

See Healy, supra note 1, at 33, 39-40.
Power Reactor Dev., 367 U.S. at 408-09 (citations omitted).
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
See id. at 955 ("Congress must abide by its delegation of authority [to an agency] until that
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Several years after the decision in Power Reactor Development, the
Court decided one of the best known pre-Chevron cases describing the
rule of deference to agency legal decisions. In Udall v. Tallman," Chief
Justice Warren presented the Court's unanimous opinion in a case that
necessitated the application of an executive and departmental order to the
question of whether certain lands were available for mineral leasing.
The case did not involve the interpretation of a statute. The Court
restated the deferential rule defined by Seminole Rock: "The Secretary's
interpretation may not be the only one permitted by the language of the
orders, but it is quite clearly a reasonable interpretation; courts must
therefore respect it. McLaren v. Fleischer,256 U.S. 477, 481; Bowles v.
Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-414.",6o By relying on McLaren
v. Fleischer, in addition to Seminole Rock, the Court indicated its
understanding that deference to interpretations of orders or regulations
was identical to deference to interpretations of statutes. McLaren,
decided in 1921, involved only the interpretation of a statute; there was
neither a regulation nor an order to interpret.
The Court emphasized this understanding of deference when, later in
the Udall v. Tallman decision, Chief Justice Warren stated that deference
to an agency interpretation of a regulation is even more appropriatethan
deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute.62 The Court did add
another rationale for deference: notice and the reliance resulting from the
application of a well-settled interpretation.63 The Court's decisions in
delegation is legislatively altered or revoked." (footnote omitted)).
58. 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
59. Id. at 3-4.
60. Id. at 4.
61. See McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 481 (1921) ("If not the only reasonable
construction of the act, it is at least an admissible one. It therefore comes within the rule that the
practical construction given to an act of Congress, fairly susceptible of different constructions, by
those charged with the duty of executing it is entitled to great respect and, if acted upon for a number
of years will not be disturbed except for cogent reasons.").
62. 380 U.S. at 16-17 ("When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows
great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its
administration.... When the construction ofan administrativeregulation ratherthan a statute is in
issue, deference is even more clearly in order." (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quotation
marks omitted)).
63. See id. at 17-18 ("The Secretary's interpretation had, long prior to respondents'
applications, been a matter of public record and discussion. The agreement worked out with the
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries in 1956 ... though probably constituting no
'legislative ratification' in any formal sense, serve[s] to demonstrate the notoriety of the Secretary's
construction, and thereby defeat any possible claim of detrimental reliance upon another
interpretation. Finally, almost the entire area covered by the orders in issue has been developed, at
very great expense, in reliance upon the Secretary's interpretation." (footnote omitted)).
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Udall v. Tallman and Power Reactor Development did not rely on the
APA in the discussion of the rule of deference or the application of that
rule.
In sum, the rule of judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of
its own regulations was well settled prior to the Chevron decision. The
settled nature of this rule did not, however, reflect a careful analysis of
the reasons for such deference. 4 The Court did not embrace any formal
explanation for deference because, as we have seen, the Court failed to
take any account of the source of law (statute or regulation) being
interpreted by the agency. The Court, instead, rested its theory of
deference on functionalism: courts should defer to an agency's
interpretation of a statute because of the agency's expertise and
experience in administering the legal regime. 5 Regarding an agency
interpretation of its regulations, the Court appeared to have accepted only
an a fortiori rationale for the rule of deference: a court defers to an
agency's interpretation of a statute, so of course a court defers to an
agency's interpretation of the regulations the agency itself has
promulgated pursuant to that statute.66
64. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("For decades, and for no good reason, we have been giving agencies the
authority to say what their rules mean, under the harmless-sounding banner of defer[ring] to an
agency's interpretation of its own regulations." (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted));
Manning, supra note 6, at 629 ("Perhaps because of the perceived common sense appeal of Seminole
Rock deference, it took many years for the Court to offer any detailed rationale for the doctrine."
(footnote omitted)).
65. See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1340 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(accepting that the Court has relied on functionalism to support Auer deference, but claiming that
functionalism "leads to the conclusion that agencies and not courts should make regulations. But it
has nothing to do with who should interpret regulations-unless one believes that the purpose of
interpretation is to make the regulatory program work in a fashion that the current leadership of the
agency deems effective. Making regulatory programs effective is the purpose of rule making, in
which the agency uses its special expertise to formulate the best rule. But the purpose of
interpretation is to determine the fair meaning of the rule-to say what the law is. Not to make
policy, but to determine what policy has been made and promulgated by the agency, to which the
public owes obedience." (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted)).
66. See Manning, supra note 6, at 627 ("The conventional wisdom is that if binding deference
is appropriate for agency interpretations of statutes, it is surely all the more so when agencies
interpret their own regulations." (footnote omitted)). Justice Scalia has rejected the view that the
Court's decisions accept an afortiorarirationale for judicial deference to an agency's interpretations
of its regulations. See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1340 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("Another conceivable justification for Auer deference, though not one that is to be found in
our cases, is this: If it is reasonable to defer to agencies regarding the meaning of statutes that
Congress enacted, as we do per Chevron, it is afortiori reasonable to defer to them regarding the
meaning of regulations that they themselves crafted. To give an agency less control over the
meaning of its own regulations than it has over the meaning of a congressionally enacted statute
seems quite odd."); cf Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 19, at 1454-55 ("[T]he originalist
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Under this reasoning, to the extent source of law mattered, the fact
that the agency was the source of the law weighed in favor of judicial
deference to the agency's legal interpretation. The Court believed that
the agency was in the best position to understand the statute, especially
because the agency interpretation was contemporaneous with the
enactment of the statute. The Court expected the agency's knowledge
and expertise to be greater with respect to regulations that the agency
itself had promulgated.
B. Chevron and the Rule ofDeference to an Agency's Interpretationof
Its Regulations
The Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.67 signaled the acceptance of a
strong rule of deference to administrative interpretations of statutes.68
The canon of construction identified in Chevron has played a critical
role in defining the relative roles of legislature, agency, and court in
developing the content of public law. The canon clearly recognizes the
primacy of the legislature by holding 'unambiguously expressed'
congressional intent determines the content of law and 'must be given
effect.' When a statute is ambiguous, however, Chevron located
lawmaking primacy in the agency, whose interpretation of law must be
upheld by a court unless it is unreasonable. 69
In Chevron, the Court articulated a strong formal rationale for
deference to an agency. Chevron's formal approach was motivated by
the separation of powers: the Court would require an agency to conform
to law that Congress clearly defined in a statute.70 If, however, the
statute were ambiguous, the Court would defer to an agency's
interpretation 7 ' because Congress had effectively delegated the resolution

justification for Seminole Rock is inapplicable in the Chevron context because in that setting, the
interpreter (the agency) did not enact the ambiguous text in question (the statute). For this reason,
some have concluded that Seminole Rock deference ought to be even more robust than Chevron
deference." (footnotes omitted)).
67. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
68. See generally Healy, supra note 1, at 15-18 (discussing the significance of the Chevron
decision); see also id. at I n.2 (citing sources describing the significance of the Chevron decision).
69. Michael P. Healy, Spurious Interpretation Redux: Mead and The Shrinking Domain of
Statutory Ambiguity, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 673, 675 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
70. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
71. See id.
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of the ambiguity to the agency.72 The Court bolstered its judgment that
deference was necessary because it was Congress's intent and followed
from constitutional structure. The Court concluded that the resolution of
the statutory ambiguity necessitates a policy decision, which under the
constitutional structure is to be made by the politically-responsive
agency, rather than the nonpolitical court.73 The Court retained the
functional rationale that the agency has greater experience and expertise
with respect to the underlying issue as an additional, rather than central,
argument for deference.74 The Court's turn to formalism interestingly
ignored the APA's significance as the statutory framework for
administrative law.
In this regard, Chevron clearly distinguished between review to
determine the best interpretation as contrasted with review to determine a
permissible interpretation. The Court would hold the agency had acted
unlawfully if the agency's interpretation conflicted with law that
Congress had clearly defined, an impermissible interpretation. Chevron
established that, if the agency interpretation were permissible, then a
court had to accept the agency interpretation as a matter of substance,
without regard to whether that interpretation was the best or the
interpretation favored by the court. The consequence of Chevron was
72. See id at 843-44 ("If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency
on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator
of an agency." (footnotes omitted)).
73. See id. at 865-66.
74. See id. at 865.
75. See Healy, supra note 1, at 18 & n.1 14; cf United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("There is some question whether Chevron was faithful to the text of the
[APA], which it did not even bother to cite." (footnote omitted)).
76. If one were to employ Professor Strauss's nomenclature, a permissible construction is one
that is within the "Chevron space." See generallyPeter L. Strauss, "Deference" Is Too ConfusingLet's Call Them "Chevron Space" and "Skidmore Weight," 112 COLUM. L. REv. 1143 (2012)
[hereinafter Strauss, "Deference " Is Too Confusing]. Professor Strauss has also presented this issue
as one that distinguishes between a court acting as a decider or as an overseer. Peter L. Strauss,
Overseers or "The Deciders"-The Courts in Administrative Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 816-17
(2008) [hereinafter Strauss, Overseers or "The Deciders"].
When the court is itself the decider, determining the correct meaning of law, the court does
not defer to an agency determination, although it may decide to give weight to the agency
determination as the court makes its own decision about the content of law. See Strauss,
"Deference" Is Too Confusing, supra at 1165 ("The lines defining an agency's Chevron space must
be judicially determined, a determination that is, irreducibly, a statement of what the law is. But that
unmistakably judicial determination should be informed by agency judgments in ways that have
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that there is no single, correct interpretation of an ambiguous statute. An
agency may change its interpretation of an ambiguous statute because the
agency's political views have changed. If that new interpretation is
permissible, Chevron holds that a court must accept that different,
permissible interpretation.77
During the years after the Chevron decision, the Supreme Court
adhered to the strong rule of deference to agency interpretations of
regulations. In the most prominent modem iteration of this rule, Auer v.
Robbins, Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. The
Court first addressed whether the agency's regulation was foreclosed by
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). 7 9 The Court deferred to
the agency's regulations because they were a reasonable construction of
an ambiguous statute.o
The Court then turned its attention to the claim that the agency had
erred in its application of the regulations. The Court reasoned:
Because the salary-basis test is a creature of the Secretary's own
regulations, his interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence,
controlling unless 'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.' Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S.
332, 359 (1989) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,8 1325
U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). That deferential standard is easily met here.
Two points about this passage are noteworthy. First, Justice Scalia's

citations tied the modern understanding of this rule to the initial
articulation of the rule in Seminole Rock. Second, Justice Scalia
characterized the standard as "deferential." A standard is deferential in
been conventional at least since 1827." (footnote omitted)). If, however, the court is acting as
overseer, the agency has been delegated authority by Congress to define the law and the court must
decide only whether the agency interpretation is permissible and must defer to the agency's
definition provided the agency is within the legal space demarcated by the ambiguity enacted by
Congress. See id. at 1173 ("[E]xecutive agencies may be vested by Congress with authority to act
with the force of law, so long as the boundaries of that action can be judicially determined. In that
space, the agency is the prime actor, and the very conclusion that Congress has delegated authority
to it commands reviewing courts to act, not as deciders, but as overseers.").
77. See Chevron, 467 U.S at 863-64. In the terminology of Professor Strauss, the agency
would in such a situation, be acting within the "Chevron space." See Strauss, "Deference" Is Too
Confusing, supra note 76, at 1163. The agency's decisionmaking process in explaining the
substantive change would, however, be reviewed under the arbitrary or capricious review standard.
See Healy, supra note 1, at 50-51.
78. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
79. Id. at 454.
80. See id. at 457-58.
81. Id at 461.
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Justice Scalia's view only when a court must accept a result even though
the court may have reached a different conclusion if the court itself had
the authority to resolve the matter.82 The court is concerned only with
whether the agency interpretation is permissible, rather than whether it is
the best interpretation.
The Court's decision in Auer is also notable because Justice Scalia
did not provide any post-Chevron rationale

for Seminole Rock

deference. 83 Despite the fact that Chevron had presented a formal
rationale for judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute,
Justice Scalia simply accepted the long-standing rule of deference
without providing any formal rationale for it. 84
One change that Chevron did not bring to the shape of
Auer/Seminole Rock deference is that the Auer Court did not describe a
two-step process for review. The Court instead adhered to the singlelevel standard of deference to an agency's permissible interpretation of
its regulation. The Court might have taken the opportunity post-Chevron
to define clearly an analytic first step, equivalent to the first step of
Chevron, at which the Court determines whether the regulation is clear in
its requirements.
Defining the review standard in that way would not have been
82. Justice Scalia's understanding of the nature of proper deference is apparent when one
accounts for his view of judicial review under the Skidmore standard. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain
Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1340 n.6 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In my view
this [Skidmore-deference] doctrine (if it can be called that) is incoherent, both linguistically and
practically. To defer is to subordinate one's own judgment to another's. If one has been persuaded
by another, so that one's judgment accords with the other's, there is no room for deferral-only for
agreement. Speaking of 'Skidmore deference' to a persuasive agency position does nothing but
confuse."); Strauss, "Deference" Is Too Confusing, supra note 76, at 1145 ("'Skidmore weight'
addresses the possibility that an agency's view on a given statutory question may in itself warrant
respect by judges who themselves have ultimate interpretive authority."); see also Lisa Schultz
Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443,
1467 (2005) ("Skidmore deference, though phrased as 'deference,' actually allocates interpretive
control to courts." (footnote omitted)).
This article will refer to Skidmore review, rather than to Skidmore deference, in order to
avoid the confusion that may result from the Court's continued use of the deference misnomer in this
context.
83. Cf Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("For decades, and for no good reason, we have been giving agencies the
authority to say what their rules mean . . . ").
84. Justice Scalia failed to provide a formalism-grounded rule of deference despite the fact that
Professor John Manning, a former law clerk to Justice Scalia, had written a strong critique of
Seminole Rock deference. See Manning, supra note 6. Justice Scalia may not have provided a
formal rationale because he may not have approved of the formal frame that earlier post-Chevron
decisions had placed around Seminole Rock deference. This formal rationale for Seminole Rock
deference is discussed infra at notes 106-28 and accompanying text.
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surprising. Old and respected Supreme Court decisions establish the
requirement that an agency must comply with its own regulations. 5 The
Court has supplemented this foundational rule by holding that an
agency's interpretation of a regulation may not change the regulation: an
agency may modify a regulation only by amending the regulation
through the rule making process.8 6 Moreover, a change to a two-step
regime would also have emphasized the significance of the status of a
regulation as law, to which a court must defer under Chevron, and which

binds an agency until the agency amends that law by conforming to the
informal rule making process prescribed by § 553 of the APA. 87
The Court's failure to identify a first step in its review of an agency's
interpretation of regulations has resulted in occasional confusion about
whether the court is deferring to the agency's interpretation or simply
finding the law clearly defined by the regulations. The failure has also
contributed to the fact that "little law or considered practice on
interpretive methodology applicable to regulations is developing."8 9
In other post-Chevron decisions, the Court has directly stated its
understanding that the Auer/Seminole Rock standard is properly
deferential-in Professor Strauss's nomenclatureo the court is acting as
overseer, rather than decider.

In Thomas Jefferson University v.

Shalala,9' the Court considered whether the Secretary of Health and
Human Services had erred in her interpretation of Medicare
regulations. 92 When the Court defined the standard of review, its
articulation was very close to the Chevron standard: The Court is not
providing its own preferred interpretation-the best interpretation-of
the legal text, but is rather deciding only whether the agency
interpretation is permissible, that is, within the space defined by the legal
text-here, regulations. The Thomas Jefferson University Court stated:

85. See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 545 (1959); United States ex rel. Accardi v.
Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260,267 (1954).
86. See Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'1 Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 100 (1995).
87. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
88. For an example of this confusion, see the discussion of Seminole Rock, supra at notes 31-43
and accompanying text.
89. See Stack, supra note 6, at 360 ("Indeed, it is hard to avoid the impression that the judiciary
does not recognize regulatory interpretation as an aspect of judicial practice, like statutory
interpretation, that merits independent and systematic consideration." (footnote omitted)).
90. See Strauss, Overseers or "The Deciders",supra note 76.
91. 512 U.S. 504 (1994).
92. Id. at 506.
93. Id. at 512.
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We must give substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of its
own regulations. Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 150-151 (1991); Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926,

939 (1986); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). Our task is not to
decide which among several competing interpretations best serves the
regulatory purpose. Rather, the agency's interpretation must be given
'controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation.' Ibid. (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,
325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). In other words, we must defer to the

Secretary's interpretation unless an 'alternative reading is compelled by
the regulation's plain language or by other indications of the
Secretary's intent at the time of the regulation's promulgation.'
Gardebringv. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988).94
In addition to stating that the Auer and Chevron review standards
have the same legal effect, the Court has on at least one occasion directly
relied on the Chevron precedent when reviewing an agency's
interpretation of a regulation, rather than a statute. In Pauley v.
BethEnergy Mines, Inc.,95 the Court considered whether the Secretary of
Labor's interpretation of regulations governing the award of black lung
benefits was lawful. 96 The Court stated that it had to "decide whether
this position is reasonable."9 The Court thereafter stated its conclusion
in terms that were very similar to its reasoning in Thomas Jefferson
University:
While it is possible that the claimants' parsing of these impenetrable
regulations would be consistent with accepted canons of construction, it
is axiomatic that the Secretary's interpretation need not be the best or
most natural one by grammatical or other standards. EEOC v.
Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988). Rather,
the Secretary's view need be only reasonable to warrant deference.
Ibid.98

The Court's willingness to equate Chevron deference with
Auer/Seminole Rock deference is reinforced by the Court's citation to the
Commercial Office Products decision. That case involved review of an
agency's interpretation of a statute, not a regulation." The BethEnergy

94. Id.
95. 501 U.S. 680 (1991).
96. Id. at 699-700.
97. Id. at 699 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
845 (1984)).
98. Id. at 702 (citation omitted).
99. EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 122 (1988).
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Mines Court's post-Chevron understanding of this rule of deference was
identical to the understanding of the pre-Chevron Tallman Court: 00 the
rule of deference to an agency interpretation of its regulations is the same
as the rule of deference to an agency interpretation of statutes.
Justice Scalia dissented in BethEnergy Mines, concluding that the
regulations had a determinate meaning that conflicted with the agency
interpretation.' 0 ' Justice Scalia agreed, however, that Chevron was the
proper deference regime applicable to review agency interpretation of
regulations, provided that the regulations were actually ambiguous.10 2
He disagreed with the majority that, under Chevron, deference to the
particular agency that had made the interpretation was proper.103 In sum,
as Chevron came to be the new paradigm for deference to agency
interpretations of statutes, the Court also understood Chevron as the
appropriate standard of review for agency interpretations of regulations.
Although Justice Scalia failed to present any rationale in Auer,
including a formal rationale, for Seminole Rock deference, the Court
included a more formal explanation for deference in several other postChevron decisions. We have seen that, prior to the emergence of the
Chevron regime, the Court's rationale for Seminole Rock deference was
functional-a court defers to an agency because the agency has greater
expertise and experience.'" The Court also opined that Seminole Rock
deference simply followed from the broader rule of deference to an
agency's interpretation of a statute. 05 In the period after Chevron, the
Court explained the Auer deference rule in more formal terms that were
similar to its explanation of Chevron deference.
The BethEnergy Mines Court, which had relied on Chevron
deference in reviewing the agency's interpretation of black lung
regulations, also employed the Chevron rationale-that a court must
defer to an agency when the agency exercises the power to make law that
has been delegated by the legislature-to an agency's interpretation of its
regulations. The Court viewed such an interpretation as another type of
agency gap filling in implementing an ambiguous statute. The Court

100. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
101. See BethEnergy Mines, 501 U.S. at 707 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. See id at 707-08.
103. See id. at 707 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("But even if the regulations were ambiguous, it would
not follow that the Secretary of Labor is entitled to deference. Nothing in our Chevron jurisprudence
requires us to defer to one agency's interpretation of another agency's ambiguous regulations.").
104. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
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stated:
As Chevron itself illustrates, the resolution of ambiguity in a statutory
text is often more a question of policy than of law. When Congress,
through express delegation or the introduction of an interpretive gap in
the statutory structure, has delegated policy-making authority to an
administrative agency, the extent of judicial review of the agency's
policy determinations is limited. 06
The Court's deference to the Department of Labor's interpretation of
regulations again reflected a convergence of the functionalism of agency
expertise 0 7 and the formalism of conformance to legislative supremacy:
The [Black Lung] Benefits Act has produced a complex and highly
technical regulatory program. The identification and classification of
medical eligibility criteria necessarily require significant expertise and
entail the exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns. In those
circumstances, courts appropriately defer to the agency entrusted by
Congress to make such policy determinations ....
That Congress intended in the [black lung program] to delegate to
the Secretary of Labor broad policymaking discretion in the
promulgation of her interim regulations is clear from the text of the
statute and the history of this provision. Congress declined to require
that the DOL adopt the HEW interim regulations verbatim. Rather, the
delegation of authority requires only that the DOL's regulations be
'not ... more restrictive than' HEW's. Further, the delegation was
made with the intention that the program evolve as technological
expertise matured. 08
The Court then reiterated its view:
As delegated by Congress, then, the Secretary's authority to promulgate
interim regulations 'not . .. more restrictive than' the HEW interim
106. BethEnergy Mines, 501 U.S. at 696 (citations omitted).
107. The functional rationale for deference has been reiterated in other post-Chevron cases. E.g.,
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) ("This broad deference [to an agency
interpretation of regulations] is all the more warranted when, as here, the regulation concerns a
complex and highly technical regulatory program, in which the identification and classification of
relevant criteria necessarily require significant expertise and entail the exercise of judgment
grounded in policy concerns." (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted)); Shalala v. Guernsey
Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 108 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I take seriously our obligation to
defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of its own regulations, particularly when, as here, the
regulation concerns a complex and highly technical regulatory program, in which the identification
and classification of relevant criteria necessarily require significant expertise and entail the exercise
of judgment grounded in policy concerns." (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted)).
108. BethEnergy Mines, 501 U.S. at 697.

2014]

THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF A UER DEFERENCE

653

regulations necessarily entails the authority to interpret HEW's
regulations and the discretion to promulgate interim regulations based
on a reasonable interpretation thereof. From this congressional
delegation derives the Secretary's entitlement to judicial deference.109

This rationale, the inferred intent of Congress regarding judicial
deference to an agency, is a restatement of the Chevron Court's rationale
for deference.1 0 This rationale is also in accord with the Court's broad
and long-standing view that Congress has authority to prescribe the
standards for judicial review. "
The Court provided a similar rationale for Auer deference in Martin
v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC)." 2
109. Id. at 698. Justice Scalia dissented from the Court's decision, concluding that the
regulations had a determinate meaning and were therefore unambiguous. See id. at 707 ("In my
view the HEW regulations referred to by the present statute are susceptible of only one meaning,
although they are so intricate that that meaning is not immediately accessible."). This was only part
of the reason for Justice Scalia's dissent. He also concluded that the majority was according
deference to the wrong agency, even assuming that the regulations were ambiguous. Id. He did,
however, agree with the Court that Chevron was otherwise the proper regime of deference to
consider:
But even if the regulations were ambiguous, it would not follow that the Secretary of
Labor is entitled to deference. Nothing in our Chevron jurisprudence requires us to defer
to one agency's interpretation of another agency's ambiguous regulations. We rejected
precisely that proposition in Martin v. OccupationalSafety and Health Review Comm'n,
499 U.S. 144 (1991), in holding that the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission (OSHRC) was not entitled to deference in interpreting the Secretary of
Labor's regulations. Having used Chevron to rebuff OSHRC's incursions there, it seems
a bit greedy for the Secretary to use Chevron to launch the DOL's own cross-border
attack here. In my view, the only legitimate claimant to deference with regard to the
present regulations is the agency that drafted them.
Id. at 707-08.
110. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)
("If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit
rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency." (footnotes
omitted)); see also Manning, supra note 6, at 627 ("Seminole Rock, like Chevron, treats the agency's
interpretation as binding; it adopts the form of deference that necessarily rests on the idea that
Congress has delegated to the agency authority to construe its own regulations." (footnote omitted));
Stack, supra note 6, at 410 ("Like Chevron, Seminole Rock deference is grounded in an attitude of
judicial deference to the agency's expertise, accountability, and a presumption of delegation."
(footnote omitted)).
111. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) ("A precondition to deference
under Chevron is a congressional delegation of legislative authority."); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 84344; Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944) ("There is no statutory provision as to what,
if any, deference courts should pay to the Administrator's conclusions.").
112. 499 U.S. 144 (1991).
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There, the Court had to determine what deference was owed to two
different agencies that shared responsibility for implementing the
Occupational Safety and Health Act.' 13 The issue arose regarding an
interpretation of a regulation promulgated by the Labor Department.114
That Department's interpretation of the regulation differed from the
interpretation of the OSHRC,' 15 the agency that adjudicated regulatory

violations. 1 6
The Court framed the issue as one that is resolved by a determination
of congressional intent.' 17 This framing is consistent with the Court's
broad view of deference: Congress defines the deference that is due to an
agency either expressly or by inference.118
The Martin Court's
unanimous conclusion was grounded in the inference that Congress
intended that a court would defer to the agency that has the greater
expertise and experience regarding the matter being interpreted:
Although the Act does not expressly address the issue, we now infer
from the structure and history of the statute that the power to render
authoritative interpretations of OSH Act regulations is a 'necessary
adjunct' of the Secretary's powers to promulgate and to enforce
national health and safety standards. The Secretary enjoys readily
identifiable structural advantages over the Commission in rendering
authoritative interpretations of OSH Act regulations. Because the
Secretary promulgates these standards, the Secretary is in a better
position than is the Commission to reconstruct the purpose of the
regulations in question. Moreover, by virtue of the Secretary's
statutory role as enforcer, the Secretary comes into contact with a much
greater number of regulatory problems than does the Commission,
which encounters only those regulatory episodes resulting in contested
citations. Consequently, the Secretary is more likely to develop the
expertise relevant to assessing the effect of a particular regulatory
interpretation.
Because historical familiarity and policymaking
expertise account in the first instance for the presumption that Congress
delegates interpretive lawmaking power to the agency rather than to the
reviewing court, we presume here that Congress intended to invest
113. Id. at 146-47.
114. Id at 148.
115. Id. at 146.
116. Id. at 152-53.
117. See id. at 151 ("Because applying an agency's regulation to complex or changing
circumstances calls upon the agency's unique expertise and policymaking prerogatives, we presume
that the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the agency's
delegated lawmaking powers. The question before us in this case is to which administrative actorthe Secretary or the Commission-did Congress delegate this 'interpretive' lawmaking power under
the OSH Act." (citation omitted) (footnote omitted)).
118. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001).

2014]

THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF A UER DEFERENCE

655

interpretive power in the administrative actor in the best position to
develop these attributes.'19
The Martin Court's consideration of the deference issue also focused
on the agency's delegated lawmaking authority. The Court concluded
that Congress intended judicial deference to an agency only when the
agency possessed lawmaking power delegated by Congress.120
Moreover, the Court reasoned that an agency adjudication constitutes
lawmaking only when Congress has delegated to an agency the power to
make law:
Within traditional agencies-that is, agencies possessing a unitary
structure-adjudication operates as an appropriate mechanism not only
for factfinding, but also for the exercise of delegated lawmaking
powers, including lawmaking by interpretation. But in these cases, we
concluded that agency adjudication is a generally permissible mode of
law-making and policymaking only because the unitary agencies in
question also had been delegated the power to make law and policy
through rule making.
Insofar as Congress did not invest the
Commission with the power to make law or policy by other means, we
cannot infer that Congress expected the Commission to use its
adjudicatory power to play a policymaking role. Moreover, when a
traditional, unitary agency uses adjudication to engage in lawmaking by
regulatory interpretation, it necessarily interprets regulations that it has
promulgated. This, too, cannot be said of the Commission's power to
adjudicate.
Consequently, we think the more plausible inference is that
Congress intended to delegate to the Commission the type of
nonpolicymaking adjudicatory powers typically exercised by a court in
the agency-review context. Under this conception of adjudication, the
Commission is authorized to review the Secretary's interpretations only
for consistency with the regulatory language and for reasonableness. In
addition, of course, Congress expressly charged the Commission with
making authoritative findings of fact and with applying the Secretary's
standards to those facts in making a decision. The Commission need be
viewed as possessing no more power than this in order to perform its
statutory role as 'neutral arbiter.'l21
Given this reasoning, the Court concluded that it would give
119. Martin,499 U.S. at 152-53 (citations omitted).
120. See id. at 151 ("Because applying an agency's regulation to complex or changing
circumstances calls upon the agency's unique expertise and policymaking prerogatives, we presume
that the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the agency's
delegated lawmaking powers." (citation omitted)).
121. Id. at 154-55 (citations omitted).
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. Chevron-like deference to the Department of Labor's interpretation of
the regulation that the Department had promulgated. 122 The Court
viewed such deference as proper even when the agency's interpretation
was presented in the agency's "litigating position."1 23 The Martin Court
stated, finally, that OSHRC's interpretations "are still entitled to some
weight on judicial review."l 24 One of the cases cited to support this
conclusion was Skidmore,125 thereby adumbrating the Court's decision in
Mead to bifurcate deference to interpretations of a statute between the
Chevron and Skidmore approaches.
Martin thus presented an understanding of Auer deference that was
consistent with Chevron deference. The Court did not abandon the longstanding functional rationale for such deference, that an agency
interpretation is presumptively proper because the agency is more
knowledgeable and experienced than a court about the issue being
resolved.126 Rather, the Court placed a formal frame around that
rationale: a court defers because Congress intended that the expert
agency, rather than the generalist court, would make legal determinations
when the statute itself did not resolve the matter. This rationale echoed
the earlier a fortiorarirationale,127 because it made no legal distinction
between different types of legal interpretations. In the Court's view,
Congress intended judicial deference regardless of whether the agency
interpreted a statute or its regulation.12 8

122. See id. at 156-57. Professors Stephenson and Pogoriler point out that the Martin Court
missed a clear opportunity to address the separation of powers concerns that undermine Auer
deference, because the Court accepted the Department's role in writing the regulation as an
important reason for deferring to that agency's interpretation. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra
note 19, at 1502-03 ("Martin missed an opportunity to remedy the self-delegation problem that is
usually inherent in Seminole Rock, but that can be avoided in vertical split-enforcement systems.").
123. See Martin, 499 U.S. at 157 ("The Secretary's interpretation of OSH Act regulations in an
administrative adjudication ... is agency action, not a post hoc rationalization of it. Moreover, when
embodied in a citation, the Secretary's interpretation assumes a form expressly provided for by
Congress. See 29 U.S.C. § 658. Under these circumstances, the Secretary's litigating position
before the Commission is as much an exercise of delegated lawmaking powers as is the Secretary's
promulgation of a workplace health and safety standard.").
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Manning, supra note 6, at 630 ("[T]he Court has found the presumption of binding
deference particularly justified because of the agency's superior competence to understand and
explain its own regulatory text." (footnote omitted)).
127. This rationale is described supra at notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
128. In this regard, the Court did not see any need to distinguish between the agency as
lawmaker (in promulgating regulations) and as law executor (in applying the regulations in
individual cases).
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C. Conclusion
In sum, Chevron had only a limited impact on the Court's
application and understanding of Seminole Rock deference. The Court
understood the two standards as equivalent in granting deference to an
agency's permissible interpretation of the law being interpreted
regardless of its status as statute or regulation. Chevron's articulation of
a formal rationale for deference did have a modest effect on the stated
rationale for what came to be called Auer deference. After Chevron, the
Court added to its purely functional explanation of this deference the
formal legislative supremacy claim that Congress intended that courts
would defer to an agency's interpretation of its regulations.12 9
We turn now to the development of the law following the Court's
decision in Mead. That decision, which reshaped the scope of Chevron
deference,130 has also had a significant impact on the unsettled present of
Auer deference, an impact discussed in the next part of this article.
III. THE UNCERTAIN PRESENT: AUER DEFERENCE INTHE AFTERMATH OF
MEAD

During the last several years, the Supreme Court has decided a
quintet of cases in which the Court has abandoned the long-standing,
reflexive use of Auer deference. The Court appears to be ever more
skeptical of Auer deference. This new skepticism can be traced to the
Supreme Court's 2001 decision in United States v. Mead Corp.'3 1 Mead
established that, when a court reviews an agency interpretation of an
ambiguous statute, the court will employ one of two standards: Chevron
deference or Skidmore review.' 32 The proper standard of review depends
on the source of the law being reviewed:
The key judicial determination yielded by this [Mead] step is the
identification of the source of the law that the court is reviewing. That

source is either the agency itself, when the agency has exercised
lawmaking power delegated to it by Congress [triggering Chevron
deference], or Congress, when the agency has simply decided what it
believes the ambiguous statute means in the particular setting for the
agency's decision [triggering Skidmore review]. Mead established ...
129.
130.
131.
132.

See supra notes 106-28 and accompanying text.
See Healy, supra note 1, at 1-2.
533 U.S. 218 (2001).
Id. at 236-37.
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that there are two requirements for an agency to be seen as the source
of lawmaking power: Congress must have delegated lawmaking power
to the agency and the agency must actually have exercised that
delegated lawmaking power. The agency must have been able to make
law and must have intended to make law. In the absence of an agency
properly making law, Congress itself is the source of the law.133
The Supreme Court's decision in Mead has affected not only the
scope of application of Chevron deference, but has revived review under
the much-older Skidmore regime. Mead's impact can now be seen as
extending to and changing the Court's understanding of Auer deference.
A. Source ofLaw as a Limit on Auer Deference: Gonzales v. Oregon
One might have anticipated that the source of law consideration, so
important in Mead, would have no applicability in the Auer context.
Because the agency is interpreting a regulation previously promulgated
by the agency itself, the agency would surely be the source of the law,
thereby triggering Chevron-style deference.1 34
In Gonzales v. Oregon,135 however, the Court applied a source-oflaw analysis in limiting the scope of Auer deference. There, the Court
reviewed "whether the Controlled Substances Act allows the United
States Attorney General to prohibit doctors from prescribing regulated
drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide, notwithstanding a state law
permitting the procedure." 3 6 The Oregon Court initially summarized the
law of deference to an agency that at the least equated Auer deference
with Chevron deference, while also expressing the limitations on the
scope of Chevron deference defined by Mead.137
133. Healy, supra note 1, at 40 (footnotes omitted).
134. Indeed, the Martin Court concluded that the Department of Labor would receive Auer
deference because that agency had promulgated the regulations being interpreted. See supra notes
120-23 and accompanying text.

135. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
136. Id. at 248-49.
137. See id. at 255-56, where the Court stated:
Although balancing the necessary respect for an agency's knowledge, expertise, and
constitutional office with the courts' role as interpreter of laws can be a delicate matter,
familiar principles guide us. An administrative rule may receive substantial deference if
it interprets the issuing agency's own ambiguous regulation. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S.
452, 461-463 (1997). An interpretation of an ambiguous statute may also receive
substantial deference. Chevron US.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-845 (1984). Deference in accordance with Chevron, however, is
warranted only 'when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation
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The Court then concluded that the regulations the Attorney General
interpreted in Oregon were simply a restatement of statutory text and
therefore constituted law defined by Congress, rather than law defined by
the agency acting pursuant to delegated lawmaking power.'18 The Court
accordingly held that, because the interpretation being challenged in the
case was, in fact, an interpretation of the statute, the Auer regime did not
apply:
The regulation uses the terms 'legitimate medical purpose' and 'the
course of professional practice,' ibid., but this just repeats two statutory
phrases and attempts to summarize the others. It gives little or no
instruction on a central issue in this case: Who decides whether a
particular activity is in 'the course of professional practice' or done for
a 'legitimate medical purpose'? Since the regulation gives no
indication how to decide this issue, the Attorney General's effort to
decide it now cannot be considered an interpretation of the regulation.
Simply put, the existence of a parroting regulation does not change the
fact that the question here is not the meaning of the regulation but the

meaning of the statute. An agency does not acquire special authority to
interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and

experience to formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to
paraphrase the statutory language. 39
Rather, the conditional, post-Mead deference regime for review of an
agency interpretation of a statute applied.140 The Court held that the
interpretation of the statute was unlawful, applying the Skidmore-review

standard.141
The Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales v. Oregon is notable in
several respects. The case reinforces the lessons of Mead by confirming
the significance of the source of law in determining the applicable
standard of review. Congress, rather than the agency, was actually the
source of the law being interpreted. Mead instructs that a court does not
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.' United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-227 (2001). Otherwise, the interpretation is 'entitled to
respect' only to the extent it has the 'power to persuade.' Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
138. See id. at 257 ("[T]he underlying regulation does little more than restate the terms of the
statute itself. The language the Interpretive Rule addresses comes from Congress, not the Attorney
General, and the near equivalence of the statute and regulation belies the Government's argument for
Auer deference.").
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. See id. at 258 ("Deference under Auer being inappropriate, we turn to the question whether
the Interpretive Rule, on its own terms, is a permissible interpretation of the [Controlled Substances
Act].").
141. See id.at269.
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defer to an agency when Congress is the source of the law being
interpreted, rather than the agency.142
The decision also accepts the long-standing view that Auer deference
is proper deference, pursuant to which a court must accept a reasonable
(that is, permissible) agency interpretation. Auer deference is, in the
Court's view, analogous to Chevron deference. Because the agency was
not itself the source of the law being interpreted, however, such
deference was not appropriate.
Finally, the Court's analysis in Oregon recognizes that the Skidmore
review regime contrasts sharply with Auer deference. Under Skidmore,
the court, rather than the agency, exercises interpretive authority and
determines the meaning of the ambiguous law being interpreted. 143 The
agency's role is limited only to convincing the court that the agency's
interpretation ought to be adopted by the court, because the agency's
interpretation is persuasive-persuasive, but not binding when it is
reasonable.
B. A Broader,Although Unintended,PracticalConsequence of Mead:
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council
Three years after the Oregon decision, the Court considered Auer
deference again in Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation
Council (SEACC). 1" There, the Court reviewed how the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) had applied the Clean Water Act to a plan by
Coeur Alaska, a mining company, "to put 4.5 million tons of tailings in
[a] lake. This [would] raise the lakebed 50 feet-to what is now the
lake's surface-and [would] increase the lake's area from 23 to about 60
acres."l 45 Coeur Alaska had received a permit under section 404146 from
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to fill the lake with the mine
142. Oregon also eliminated the incentive for an agency to gain deference by incorporating
ambiguous statutory text in its regulations. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 19, at 1464
("[A]n agency confronted with a statutory ambiguity might try to bootstrap its way into the
equivalent of Chevron deference by promulgating a legislative rule that preserves or restates the
statutory ambiguity, and then issuing an interpretive rule that purports to interpret not the statute, but
the regulation. If Seminole Rock is applied in such cases, it would be quite easy for agencies to
circumvent Mead.").
143. Skidmore review is contrasted with Chevron deference supra at notes 82, 132-33 and
accompanying text. The nature of a court's role when reviewing under the Skidmore regime is also
discussed in Healy, supranote 1, at 46-49.
144. 557 U.S. 261 (2009).
145. Id. at 267-68.
146. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012).
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tailings.147 The EPA had not vetoed the section 404 permit as authorized
by section 404(c) of the Clean Water Act. 148
SEACC argued that the mining company's activities were subject to
the section 306149 requirement that any new source of pollution
discharged into waters of the United States comply without exception to
new source effluent limitations.150 The EPA had promulgated new
source effluent limitations for froth-flotation gold mines, the category of
sources into which the Coeur Alaska plant fell. SEACC argued that
those standards must apply to Coeur Alaska's planned mining operations,
rather than the section 404 permit allowing the filling of the lake.'
The majority first concluded that the Clean Water Act itself was
ambiguous regarding the interaction of section 404 and section 306.152
The majority also concluded that the regulations promulgated by EPA
were ambiguous regarding this interaction."'
Having so far discerned only ambiguity, the majority turned to the
agency's interpretation of its regulations. That interpretation was
presented in a memorandum prepared in 2004 by the EPA's Director of
the Office of Wetlands, Oceans and Watersheds.1 54 The question then
arose about which deference regime to apply to this interpretation of the
regulations. Applying the Mead analysis, the Court summarily stated its
conclusion that Chevron deference did not apply because the 2004
memorandum was "not subject to sufficiently formal procedures to merit
Chevron deference." 155 The Court then stated that the memorandum "is
entitled to a measure of deference because it interprets the agencies' own

147. See Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 268.
148. See id. at 270 (discussing EPA's failure to act under 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c)).
149. 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (2012).
150. See Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 271.
151. See id.
152. Id. at 281 ("The CWA is ambiguous on the question whether § 306 applies to discharges of
fill material regulated under § 404."). Justice Ginsburg, writing for three dissenters, concluded that
the statute clearly required that section 306 trumped section 404 because the former provision
applied without limit to new sources. Id. at 301. The dissent also argued that, even if the statute
were ambiguous, clear statement rules required that the Clean Water Act clearly provide that section
404 trump the more stringent effluent limits required by section 306. Id at 303-04. The dissenters
argued that, in the absence of such clarity-clarity that the majority did not claim-the statute had to
be read to preclude section 404 permitting. See id. at 304.
153. See id. at 282 ("The regulations, like the statutes, do not address the question whether § 306,
and the EPA new source performance standards promulgated under it, apply to § 404 permits and the
discharges they authorize.").
154. Id. at 283. The government reiterated this interpretation in the litigation. See id. at 274.
155. Id. at 283-84 (citation to Mead omitted).
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This statement and

the citation to Auer indicated-in sharp contrast to the Court's broad
view of Auer deference in Oregon' 57-the Court's view that Auer
deference differs from and is less deferential than Chevron deference.
In addition to this surprising statement indicating the more limited
nature of Auer deference, the Court's analysis of the permissibility of the
agency's interpretation was quite close, with the Court presenting no less
than five specific reasons why the interpretation was reasonable. 5 8 The
Court's analysis suggested strongly that, although it was making its own
decision about the meaning of the regulations, the Court was willing to
be convinced by the agency's views.' 59 This is the essence of Skidmore
review, rather than Chevron deference.160
The similarity between the Court's review of the agency
interpretation in Coeur Alaska and Skidmore review is reinforced by the
Court's consideration of SEACC's contention that the Court should
reject the agency's interpretation because the agency's interpretation had
changed.' 6 1 The Court did not take the approach of the Chevron
deference regime and simply state that an agency's change in position is
irrelevant to the deference that is owed.16 2 Rather, the Court concluded,
after close analysis, that the agency had not changed its position.163 The
negative implication of the Court's analysis is that the Court may not
have reached the same conclusion about the permissibility of the
agency's position if the agency had changed its position.
The Court's analysis begs the question: Why would the Court apply
Auer deference in a less deferential manner. The simplest explanation is
that, because the Court had specifically determined that Chevron

156. Id. at 284 (emphasis added).
157. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
158. See CoeurAlaska, 557 U.S. at 284-86.
159. See id at 286 ("The Regas Memorandum's interpretation of the agencies' regulations is
consistent with the regulatory scheme as a whole. The Memorandum preserves a role for the EPA's
performance standards; it guards against the possibility of evasion of those standards; it employs the
Corps' expertise in evaluating the effects of fill material on the aquatic environment; it does not
allow toxic pollutants to be discharged; and we have been offered no better way to harmonize the
regulations. We defer to the EPA's conclusion that its performance standard does not apply to the
initial discharge of slurry into the lake but applies only to the later discharge of water from the lake
into the downstream creek.").
160. See Healy, supra note 1, at 46-47.
161. See CoeurAlaska, 557 U.S. at 288-89.
162. See Healy, supra note 1, at 50-51.
163. See Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 290-91. Indeed, the Court concluded that the agency had in
its "published statements ... adhere[d] to" its interpretation. Id. at 290.
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deference did not apply,' the Court thought it was simply natural and
appropriate to accord less deference to this informal interpretation. The
same result would have occurred had the agency interpreted the statute
and Skidmore review had applied.
This view that the Court was effectively saying, "Mead made me do
it," when it gave only limited deference to the agency interpretation of
the regulations, was presented by Justice Scalia's concurrence. Justice
65
Scalia, the lone voice on the Court decrying the decision in Mead,1
believed that Mead had caused the Court to define a new regime for
review because the Court had limited the scope of Chevron deference.16 6
Justice Scalia believed, however, that the Coeur Alaska Court was
actually applying the Chevron regime and that there was no reason to
pretend otherwise. 67 Justice Scalia did not remark, contrary to the view
expressed above, that the Court had changed its application of Auer
deference so that it was not equivalent to Chevron deference, which
Mead indicated was not due.16 8
In sum, CoeurAlaska suggested that Mead's impact would prove to
be broader than initially indicated. If the Mead analysis determined that
an agency interpretation must not receive Chevron deference, the Court
ought not to apply Chevron-equivalent deference by another name. The
Court accordingly reshaped its understanding of Auer deference. This
deference regime, which had long been understood to be equivalent to
Chevron deference, was now understood by the Coeur Alaska Court as
different and less deferential than Chevron. This new understanding of
Auer deference sharply contrasts with the Court's understanding in
Oregon.
This new-style Auer deference takes account of an agency's change
164. See id. at 284.
165. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166. See Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 296 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("It is quite impossible to achieve
predictable (and relatively litigation-free) administration of the vast body of complex laws
committed to the charge of executive agencies without the assurance that reviewing courts will
accept reasonable and authoritative agency interpretation of ambiguous provisions. If we must not
call that practice Chevron deference, then we have to rechristen the rose.").
167. See id. at 295 ("[I]f today's opinion is not according the agencies' reasonable and
authoritative interpretation of the Clean Water Act Chevron deference, it is according some new type
of deference-perhaps to be called in the future Coeur Alaska deference-which is identical to
Chevron deference except for the name.").
168. Justice Breyer's concurrence also seemed to suggest that there is no real difference between
Chevron deference and Auer deference. See id at 292-93 ("At minimum, the EPA might reasonably
read the statute and the applicable regulations as allowing the use of such material, say crushed rock,
as 'fill' in some of these situations. Cf. Chevron US.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-844 (1984); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).").
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of interpretive position and makes Auer deference equivalent to
Skidmore review, which is not deference at all. This new understanding
does, however, conform to the dictates of Mead by declining to give
proper deference to an agency interpretation that is not itself the agency's
exercise of delegated lawmaking power.
C. A New Contentfor Auer Deference: Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan

Bell Telephone Co.
The next significant decision in the Supreme Court's ongoing and
inconsistent reevaluation of Auer deference was Talk America, Inc. v.
Michigan Bell Telephone Co.' 6 9 There, the Court reviewed how the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had implemented a
statutory requirement regarding the sharing of facilities at discounted
rates by incumbent local exchange carriers (LECs) with competitive
LECs.o70 Incumbent LECs had prevailed before the court of appeals in
their argument that the FCC had acted unlawfully when it required
incumbent LECs to provide competitive LECs with access to entrance
facilities at (discounted) cost-based rates. 7' The FCC had imposed this
requirement pursuant to its regulations implementing 47 U.S.C. §
251 (c)(2). That provision requires that incumbent 72LECs ensure
"interconnection" for customers of the competitive LECs.1
In reviewing the agency action, the Supreme Court first considered
the statute and the agency regulations and concluded that both were
ambiguous.' 7 ' The Court then turned its attention to the FCC's
interpretation of its regulations-an interpretation that the agency had
advanced in its amicus curiae brief before the Court.174 The Court
introduced the Auer standard of deference by quoting from its recent
decision in Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy: 7 1
[W]e defer to an agency's interpretation of its regulations, even in a
legal brief, unless the interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent

169. 131 S.Ct. 2254 (2011).
170. Id. at2257-58.
171. See id.
at 2259.
172. 47 U.S.C. §251(c)(2) (2012).
173. See Talk America, 131 S. Ct. at 2260 ("No statute or regulation squarely addresses whether
an incumbent LEC must provide access to entrance facilities at cost-based rates as part of its
interconnection duty under § 251 (c)(2).").
174. See id.
at 2260-61.
175. 131 S. Ct. 871 (2011).
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with the regulation[s] or there is any other reason to suspect that the
interpretation does not reflect the agency's fair and considered
judgment on the matter in question.176
The Court then summarized the three steps that the agency had taken

in reaching its interpretive result.177 The Court concluded its review of
the FCC interpretation by accounting for the FCC's previous action,
following a skeptical decision of the D.C. Circuit, to amend its
regulation's "definition of dedicated transport-a type of network
element-to include entrance facilities." 7 The Court viewed the FCC's
conclusion that entrance facilities are part of an incumbent LEC's
network as "more than reasonable"l 7 9 and "perfectly sensible." 80 At the
end of its analysis, the Court came to its own conclusion that "[e]ntrance
facilities, at least when used for the mutual exchange of traffic, seem to
us to fall comfortably within the definition of interconnection."'"' For
good measure, the Court added that "there is no danger that deferring to
the Commission would effectively permit the agency, under the guise of
interpreting a regulation, to create defacto a new regulation." 82
Having concluded that the substance of the agency interpretation was
reasonable, the Court turned to whether the interpretation "reflect(ed] the
agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in question."' 83 The
Court stated that, "although the FCC concedes that it is advancing a
novel interpretation of its longstanding interconnection regulations,
novelty alone is not a reason to refuse deference."1 84 The Court
emphasized that the agency had not changed its ultimate conclusion, but
had simply revised the reasons supporting the conclusion. 8 s The Court
also stated that the FCC's expertise and experience in addressing a
complicated regulatory issue warranted judicial deference.86
176. Talk America, 131 S. Ct. at 2261 (2011) (quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
177. See id.
178. Id. at 2262 (citations omitted).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 2263 (citation omitted).
182. Id. (quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
183. Id. at 2261 (quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
184. Id. at 2263.
185. See id. at 2264 ("The Commission then found another way to support that same
conclusion."); see also id at 2265 ("[T]he Triennial Review Remand Order reinstated the ultimate
conclusion of the Triennial Review Order and changed only the analysis through which [it] reached
that conclusion." (quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)).
186. The Court stated in this regard that:
The parties and their amici dispute whether an incumbent LEC has any way of knowing
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Justice Scalia concurred in the Court's judgment.'87 He abjured the
use of Auer deference, concluding that the FCC interpretation was "the
fairest reading of the orders in question."' 88 He stated that the order may
have been clearer, but its meaning as written was sufficiently clear,
without any need for deference.189 Justice Scalia then proceeded to
present a strong criticism of Auer deference, despite the fact that "in the
past [he] uncritically accepted that rule."l 90 He contended that the rule of
deference conflicts with basic separation of powers principles by
allowing the same government actor to make law, in the form of the
regulation, and then apply that law by interpretation of the regulation.' 9 1
Justice Scalia argued that independent review is necessary for the
application of law.' 9 2 He then stated his willingness to reconsider Auer
deference in a proper case. 193
The approach of the majority in Talk America is similar to the
Court's approach in CoeurAlaska. In both cases, the Court purported to
apply Auer deference. The Court's analysis, however, differs from
proper Chevron deference. The Court gave "deference" only after it
concluded that the agency had not changed its position. The Court
focused its analysis far more on how convincing the agency's
interpretation was, rather than on whether, as in Chevron analysis, the
law being interpreted (here, the agency regulations) is sufficiently
ambiguous to permit the agency interpretation. This less deferential
approach is understandable given that the agency's position, defined in
an amicus brief,194 would not have received Chevron deference if the
how a competitive LEC is using an entrance facility. This technical factual dispute
simply underscores the appropriateness of deferring to the FCC. So long as the
Commission is acting within the scope of its delegated authority and in accordance with
prescribed procedures, it has greater expertise and stands in a better position than this
Court to make the technical and policy judgments necessary to administer the complex
regulatory program at issue here.
Id. at 2265 n.7.
187. Id at 2265 (Scalia, J., concurring).
188. Id. at 2266.
189. See id
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. See id. ("[W]hen an agency promulgates an imprecise rule, it leaves to itself the
implementation of that rule, and thus the initial determination of the rule's meaning. And though the
adoption of a rule is an exercise of the executive rather than the legislative power, a properly adopted
rule has fully the effect of law. It seems contrary to fundamental principles of separation of powers
to permit the person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well.").
193. See id.
194. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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agency had been interpreting a statute. 9 The Court's approach in Talk
America was similar to its approach in Coeur Alaska and it applied Auer
deference as though it were Skidmore review. In both cases, the Court
itself actually made the substantive interpretation of ambiguous law,
despite purporting to give Auer deference to the agency. 196
D. The Meadification of Auer Deference: Christopher v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp.
The Court's consideration of Auer deference took yet another turn in
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.' 97 This case concerned the
legal status of drug detailers, which are employees who provide
pharmaceutical information and promote prescription drugs to doctors.198
Pharmaceutical companies took the position that these workers were
"outside salesm[e]n" under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and
were therefore not subject to that statute's requirements regarding timeand-a-half wages for overtime.' 9 9 The statute did not include a definition
of an "outside salesman," but instead delegated authority to the
Department of Labor (DOL) to define the term.200
Although the Court did not directly state that the regulations were
ambiguous regarding the categorization of the detailers as "outside
salesm[e]n," the inference of regulatory ambiguity follows because the
Court felt it necessary to address the question "whether the DOL's
interpretation of the regulations is owed deference under Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997)."201
The DOL's position that the drug detailers were subject to the FLSA

195. Mead would not view the filing of an amicus brief as an agency's exercise of lawmaking
power, assuming that Congress had delegated such power to the agency.
196. See supranotes 158-63, 177-85 and accompanying text.
197. 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
198. See id. at 2163-64 ("Pharmaceutical companies promote their prescription drugs to
physicians through a process called 'detailing,' whereby employees known as 'detailers' or
'pharmaceutical sales representatives' provide information to physicians about the company's
products in hopes of persuading them to write prescriptions for the products in appropriate cases.
The position of 'detailer' has existed in the pharmaceutical industry in substantially its current form
since at least the 1950's, and in recent years the industry has employed more than 90,000 detailers
nationwide." (citations omitted)).
199. See id. at 2164.
200. Id at 2162.
201. Id at 2165 (citation omitted). As was discussed previously, a court has not been required
by the Auer standard to consider first whether the regulation has a clear meaning regarding the legal
question. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
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had been presented in a series of amicus briefs beginning in 2009.202 The
Court responded to the request for Auer deference by identifying
multiple circumstances under which such deference is not owed to the
agency:
Although Auer ordinarily calls for deference to an agency's
interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation, even when that
interpretation is advanced in a legal brief, this general rule does not
apply in all cases. Deference is undoubtedly inappropriate, for
example, when the agency's interpretation is plainly erroneous or
And deference is likewise
inconsistent with the regulation.
unwarranted when there is reason to suspect that the agency's
interpretation does not reflect the agency's fair and considered
judgment on the matter in question. This might occur when the
agency's interpretation conflicts with a prior interpretation, or when it
appears that the interpretation is nothing more than a convenient
litigating position, or a post hoc rationalization advanced
by an agency
seeking to defend past agency action against attack. 2 03
The Court concluded that, in this case, "there are strong reasons for
,,204 Teaec
withholding the deference that Auer generally requires.
The agency
had changed its interpretation of the regulation in a way that resulted in
"'unfair surprise"'205 as a result of the "impos[ition] [of] potentially
massive liability on respondent for conduct that occurred well before that
[new] interpretation was announced." 206 The Court believed deference
would undermine the APA requirement that an agency pursue notice and
comment rule making before it changed its regulations.20 7 The Court
therefore refused to accord Auer deference to the agency
interpretation. 208 Having rejected Auer deference, the Court immediately
stated that:

202. See id The Court restated its view that an agency interpretation of regulations included in
an amicus brief may properly receive Auer deference. See id. at 2166 (citing Chase Bank USA, N.A.
v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 880 (2011)).
203. Id. at 2166 (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
204. Id. at 2167.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See id. at 2168.
208. See id. at 2168 ("[W]hatever the general merits of Auer deference, it is unwarranted here.").
Justice Breyer seemed to agree in his dissent that the DOJ position did not warrant deference. See
id. at 2175 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("In light of important, near-contemporaneous differences in the
Justice Department's views as to the meaning of relevant Labor Department regulations, I also agree
that we should not give the Solicitor General's current interpretive view any especially favorable
weight." (citation omitted)).
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We instead accord the Department's interpretation a measure of
deference proportional to the 'thoroughness evident in its consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.'
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (quoting
Skidmore v. Swfit & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).209
There are two important dimensions to the Court's interpretive
approach. First, the Court clearly confirms, if there was any doubt, that
it understands Auer deference to be different than Skidmore review.
SmithKline is accordingly in tension with Coeur Alaska and Talk
America, both of which had applied Auer deference so that it was
equivalent to Skidmore review. 2 10 SmithKline is, however, consistent
with Oregon, which took the traditional view that Auer deference is
equivalent to Chevron deference. 21 '
The second important aspect of the Court's analysis in SmithKline is
that the Court effectively imposed a test to determine whether an agency
interpretation of regulations ought to receive the preferred deferential
standard. This test performs a function that is the same as the test for the
application of Chevron deference defined by Mead. Moreover, the
consequence of failing the test for the application of Auer deference is
precisely the same as for failing the Mead test: the Court proceeds with
212
Skidmore review.
The Court then assessed the agency's interpretation and was wholly
unconvinced by it, concluding that it was not "persuasive in its own
right." 2 13 Because the agency was unpersuasive, the Court stated that it
"must employ traditional tools of interpretation to determine whether
petitioners are exempt outside salesmen."2 14 It is notable that the Court
understood review under the Skidmore standard as different than the
Court reaching its own interpretive judgment. In this regard, the Court
appears to have been tricked by the misleading nomenclature of
Skidmore "deference." The Skidmore regime does not actually involve

209. Id. at 2168-69 (citations omitted).
210. See supra Parts III.B and M.C.
211. See supra Part M.A.
212. This analytic approach also has the effect of reinforcing the Court's traditional
understanding of the equivalence of Chevron and Auer deference. See, e.g., supra note 137 and
accompanying text. The Court had appeared in Coeur Alaska and Talk America to view Auer
deference as weaker than Chevron deference. See supranote 196 and accompanying text.
213. SmithKline, 132 S. Ct. at 2170.
214. Id.
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deference by a court.215 That regime, instead, allows the agency the
chance to convince the court of the persuasiveness of its position based
on its experience and expertise. The ultimate interpretive judgment is,
however, for the court, which independently evaluates the agency's
persuasiveness and decides for itself the best interpretation of the
regulation. 216 Moreover, given how the SmithKline Court defined the test
to determine whether Auer deference is applicable,217 it is unlikely there
will be many cases in which the agency view persuades the court,
because the court will have previously decided that the circumstances
indicate that Skidmore review, rather than Auer deference, is warranted.
The Court's analysis makes an agency's change in the interpretation of
its ambiguous regulations 218 doubly problematic for the agency. Such a
change is a reason to deny Auer deference and a reason for reduced
persuasive value under Skidmore. The result is that an agency is
encouraged to amend the regulations in accordance with required rule
making procedures, rather than change its interpretation of them.
The SmithKline Court then applied its own independent interpretive
judgment and concluded that the drug detailers were exempt from the
wage and hour requirements of the FLSA.2 19
E. A Last Gaspfor Auer Deference?: Decker v. Northwest
Environmental Defense Center
The Court returned to the question of Auer deference in the October
2012 Term. In Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center,2 20
the Court considered a citizen suit in which the plaintiff claimed that
logging companies in Oregon had violated the Clean Water Act by
discharging pollution into "waters of the United States" without
necessary permits. 2 2 ' The relevant discharges had resulted from the use
of culverts, pipes and other conveyances to transport storm runoff that

215. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
216. See SmithKline, 132 S. Ct. at 2170.
217. See supranote 203 and accompanying text.
218. Recall that if the meaning of the regulation is clear, the agency is bound by the content of
that law. See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 545 (1959). When a regulation is clear, the agency's
only option to change the content of the law is by amending the regulation in compliance with
statutory procedural requirements: An agency may not change a regulation by an interpretation. See
Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'1 Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 100 (1995).
219. SmithKline, 132 S. Ct. at 2173.
220. 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
221. Id. at 1330.
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contained eroded soil and materials from logging roads.222
The
government nevertheless did not require a permit because its
interpretation was that these discharges were not "associated with
industrial activity." 2 23 The court of appeals had concluded that the
regulation was unambiguous that the discharge was subject to the permit
requirement.224
The Supreme Court concluded first that the statute was ambiguous
because the statutory term "industrial activity" has "multiple definitions"
and the statute "provides no further detail as to its intended scope."225
The Court then found the regulations to be ambiguous regarding whether
"the regulation extends only to traditional industrial buildings such as
factories and associated sites, as well as other relatively fixed
facilities."2 26 The Court found that "[t]he EPA's interpretation is a
permissible one."227 The Court viewed the EPA as reasonable in its view
that discharges had to be permitted only when they "related in a direct
way to operations 'at an industrial plant."' 2 28 In upholding the
permissibility of the agency's interpretation, the Court relied upon the
Auer deference standard.229
The Court then concluded that the limits on Auer deference
enumerated in SmithKline were not applicable:
There is another reason to accord Auer deference to the EPA's

222. Id. at 1330-31.
223. See id. at 1330.
224. Id at 1333-34. The EPA took action after the court of appeals decision to amend its
regulations to specify clearly that a permit was required for "only those logging operations that
involve the four types of activity (rock crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, and log storage
facilities) that are defined as point sources by the explicit terms of the Silvicultural Rule." Id. at
1333. The final version of this amended regulation was promulgated a few days before the Supreme
Court heard oral argument in the case. Id at 1332.
225. Id. at 1336.
226. Id. at 1337.
227. Id.
228. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
229. See id. ("It is well established that an agency's interpretation need not be the only possible
reading of a regulation-or even the best one-to prevail. When an agency interprets its own
regulation, the Court, as a general rule, defers to it unless that interpretation is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation." (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted)). Justice Scalia
maintained that the agency's interpretation was hardly the best. See id. at 1339 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The Court there gives effect to a reading of EPA's
regulations that is not the most natural one, simply because EPA says that it believes the unnatural
reading is right. It does this, moreover, even though the agency has vividly illustrated that it can
write a rule saying precisely what it means-by doing just that while these cases were being
briefed.").
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interpretation: there is no indication that its current view is a change
from prior practice or a post hoc justification adopted in response to
litigation. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct.
2156, 2166-2167 (2012). The opposite is the case. The agency has
been consistent in its view that the types of discharges at issue here do
not require NPDES permits.230
Despite having concluded that deference was appropriate because the
agency interpretation was reasonable, the Court added its own additional
reason for the agency interpretation: the agency's approach furthered the
statute's goal of coordinating federal and local controls on storm water
pollution. 23 1 This additional rationale suggested, perhaps, the Court's
discomfort with the permissibility of the agency's interpretation,
especially given the sharp dissent of Justice Scalia.
The Decker Court accordingly viewed Auer deference as equivalent
to Chevron deference,232 which starkly contrasts with Skidmore review.
The Court applied its rule that an agency would not always receive Auer
deference for its interpretation of a regulation. The Court continued to
test whether Auer deference was appropriate. One reason why a court
will not accord Auer deference to an interpretation is that the agency has
changed its interpretation.233 Critically, however, the Decker Court
clearly accepted the permissibility of applying a properly deferential
standard, despite the sharply stated, continuing dismay of Justice Scalia,
who again criticized the permissibility of deference to an agency
interpretation of its regulations on separation of powers grounds.234
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the majority again responded to this
foundational critique with silence. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by
Justice Alito, did concur, however, and stated that Justice Scalia "raises
230. Id. at 1337-38 (citations omitted).
231. See id at1338.
232. Justice Scalia agreed with this understanding of the effect of Auer deference. See id.at
1339-40 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The canonical formulation of Auer
deference is that we will enforce an agency's interpretation of its own rules unless that interpretation
is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. But of course whenever the agency's
interpretation of the regulation is different from the fairest reading, it is in that sense 'inconsistent'
with the regulation. Obviously, that is not enough, or there would be nothing for Auer to do. In
practice, Auer deference is Chevron deference applied to regulations rather than statutes. The
agency's interpretation will be accepted if, though not the fairest reading of the regulation, it is a
plausible reading-within the scope of the ambiguity that the regulation contains." (citations
omitted) (quotation marks omitted)).
233. The Court was less consistent in the order of its analysis. In Decker, the Court applied the
analysis of whether Auer deference is appropriate after the Court applied that standard of review.
See id. at 1337-38.
234. See id at 1339-41 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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serious questions about the principle set forth in [Seminole Rock and
Auer]. It may be appropriate to reconsider that principle in an
appropriate case. But this is not that case."235
F. Conclusion
This group of five cases presents a Court that has become
increasingly uncertain about Auer deference. The Court's uncertainty
has several sources. Most importantly, the Court's decision in Mead
narrowed the scope of application of Chevron deference. The Court
appears quite uncomfortable giving an agency Chevron-like deference,
when the agency interpretation would not meet the requirements for
Chevron deference defined by Mead. Indeed, the Court faced exactly
this problem in Coeur Alaska.
The Court's solution to this problem in Coeur Alaska was to treat
Auer deference as equivalent to Skidmore review, rather than to Chevron
deference.236 This approach resolves the problem posed by Mead by
simply treating Auer deference as equivalent to Skidmore review, which
applies when Mead determines that Chevron deference is not applicable.
The approach, however, conflicts with the long-standing understanding
of Auer deference, which had been that Auer deference is equivalent to
Chevron deference.
The Mead test for the application of Chevron deference also appears
to have caused uncertainty for the Court about the proper nature of Auer
deference. The effect of Mead analysis is that an agency must, in effect,
win the application of proper Chevron deference by actually making law
in the exercise of delegated lawmaking power. 2 37 In three of the recent
235. Id. at 1338. Justice Breyer did not participate in the decision.
The Court gave the same reduced effect to Auer deference in Talk
236. See supra Part IB.
America. See supraPart HI.C.
237. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 19, at 1464 (footnote omitted), who state that:
In the statutory interpretation context, agencies have a choice: they can use notice-andcomment proceedings to promulgate their statutory interpretations as legislative rules, in
which case they will presumptively receive Chevron deference, or they can opt to issue
these interpretations informally as interpretive rules, in which case they will have to
defend their interpretations under the less deferential Skidmore standard. But they have
to select one or the other. This 'pay me now or pay me later' principle has gradually
emerged as a crucial feature of the doctrine, one that allows courts to avoid direct
regulation of agency choice of policymaking form while retaining some form of
meaningful check-either ex ante procedural safeguards or ex post judicial scrutiny--on
administrative decisions.
Cf Stack, supra note 6, at 398-99 ("As reflected in the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Mead Corp., statutory authority alone is not sufficient to warrant deference under Chevron; the
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quintet of cases, the Court viewed Auer deference as equivalent to
Chevron deference. These three cases, Oregon, SmithKline, and Decker,
followed the lead of Mead by establishing limits on the scope of
application of proper Auer deference. Oregon held that an agency would
not receive Auer deference when Congress, rather than the agency, was
actually the source of the law being interpreted. SmithKline and Decker
held that the deferential Auer standard applied to an agency's
interpretation of regulations it had promulgated only when the
interpretation had not changed and the interpretation was not a post-hoc
rationalization. These cases thus build on Mead by establishing that
there must be a test of applicability for a standard of review that, as with
Chevron, is properly deferential to an agency.
It is important also to consider what these two limits tell us about the
post-Mead Court's understanding of the nature of Auer deference. An
agency's ability to change its interpretation has long been an important
consideration when a court reviews an agency's legal interpretation. The
Skidmore review standard discounts the persuasiveness of the agency's
Chevron
interpretation when that interpretation has changed.238
deference then altered the legal significance of an agency's change in
position:
[C]hange is not invalidating, since the whole point of Chevron is to
leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the
implementing agency. An initial agency interpretation is not instantly
carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency ... must consider varying
interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis, for
example, in response to changed factual circumstances, or a change in
administrations. That is no doubt why in Chevron itself, this Court
deferred to an agency interpretation that was a recent reversal of agency
policy.239

In short, as long as an agency's changed interpretation fits within the
space created by the legal ambiguity, Chevron deference accepts the
agency's changed interpretation as permissible.
The Court's decision post-Mead to reject the application of proper
Auer deference when an agency changes its position shows that the Court
agency's reason-giving is a precondition to, and the object of, deference. In other words, the
agency's reasoned analysis is the coin by which it pays for (and warrants) deference to its
interpretation of the law." (footnotes omitted)).
238. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
239. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981-82 (2005)
(citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
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is unwilling simply to accept an agency's movement within the space
created by the ambiguity in its own regulation. 24 0 This apparent
willingness on the Court's part to grant proper deference to only a single
permissible interpretation was motivated in SmithKline by the majority's
concern that a regulated party would be unfairly surprised by a changed
interpretation, especially one that "impose[d] potentially massive
liability" on that party.24 1 Justice Scalia has advocated this concern most
stridently by urging that the Court abandon Auer deference in his
dissenting and separate opinions.242
Moreover, an agency's ability to change its interpretation of a
regulation undercuts the value that rule making has in notifying regulated
parties about the applicable legal standard.243 If an agency is able to
change its interpretation and receive judicial deference, the agency is
able to avoid the notice and comment rule making process and the
interaction with regulated parties. 244
An agency's change in its
interpretation of its regulations also weakens to some degree the Accardi
principle because such a change allows the agency to change the
application of the rule, despite Accardi's mandate that an agency be
bound by its rules.245 In sum, the Court's first post-Mead limit on the
application of Auer deference importantly eliminates a key characteristic
of Chevron deference.
The second limit on the application of Auer deference is that the
agency interpretation must not be a post-hoc rationalization by the
agency. This limitation seems analogous to the long-standing limit on
agency interpretations of statutes: such interpretations must pass muster
substantively and must also result from a proper decisionmaking

240. The Court's view of the significance of an agency's change of position in the Auer
deference context has not been consistent. In Long Island Health Care at Home v. Coke, 551 U.S.
158, 170-71 (2007) (citations omitted), the Court stated that: "[W]e concede that the Department
may have interpreted these regulations differently at different times in their history. But as long as
interpretive changes create no unfair surprise... the change in interpretation alone presents no
separate ground for disregarding the Department's present interpretation." Ensuring that there is no
"unfair surprise" is very different than rejecting the otherwise applicable review standard based on a
change in interpretation.
241. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2167 (2012).
242. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich.
Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2265-66 (2011).
243. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947); Nat'l Petroleum Refiners Ass'n
v. F.T.C., 482 F.2d 672, 681-84 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
244. See 5 U.S.C. §553 (2012) (prescribing procedures for informal rule making).
245. The Accardi principle is discussed supra at notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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process.24 6 In the statutory interpretation context, the Court has not seen
this requirement as a limit on the scope of applicability of the standard
for deferring to the agency's substantive interpretation. Rather, the Court
has held that even if the agency's substantive interpretation is lawful, the
interpretation remains subject to arbitrary or capricious review to ensure
that the agency has considered the proper factors and provided a
sufficient explanation of its interpretation. Ensuring a proper process of
decisionmaking also seems appropriate in the context of the
interpretation of a regulation.
Having considered the Court's new limits on the application of
proper Auer deference, we turn to a final source of uncertainty about
Auer deference in the post-Meadera. Justice Scalia has presented on two
recent occasions the strong critique that Auer deference conflicts with
core separation of powers principles: the branch that makes law should
not have the power to interpret and apply that law as well.247 This
critique holds that the judiciary must itself interpret agency regulations.
Justice Scalia's long-delayed mission to abolish Auer deference, after
having written the post-Chevron opinion that gives the name to this
standard of deference, shows that the Court applied deference in this
context without ever establishing any clear rationale for its use. The lack
of theoretical support for Auer deference contrasts sharply with the
articulation of administrative law theory to support Chevron deference.
Although the Court has so far retained Auer deference with a
narrowed scope of applicability in the face of Justice Scalia's
foundational critique, the Court recently curtailed its scope of application
or applied the standard as though it were Skidmore review. Having now
considered the past and present of AuerlSeminole Rock deference, we
turn to a consideration of the future and the need for a theoretically
defensible standard of review that accounts for both form and function in
administrative law.

246. See Healy, supra note 1, at 43, 49-50.
247. See supra note 242.
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IV. THE FUTURE: A PROPERLY THEORIZED STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR
AN AGENCY INTERPRETATION OF ITS OwN REGULATIONS

A. Define a Two-Step Standardfor Reviewing an Agency's
Interpretationoflts Regulation
This section will present theoretical support for the adoption of a
new rule of deference when a court reviews an agency's interpretation of
its own regulations. From its initial articulation in Seminole Rock, the
rule of deference to an agency's interpretation of its regulations has been
muddled by the Court's immediate incantation that it would accept all
but a "plainly erroneous" interpretation,2 48 without first requiring that the
court exercise its role of determining the content of already-defined
law. 24 9 The result of this flawed order of analysis in Seminole Rock was
that the Court purported to be deferring to an agency interpretation of
law that was clearly compelled by the terms of the regulation.250 Even
after Chevron defined its now-famous two-step order of analysis, the
Court adhered to a one-step approach when reviewing regulations,
beginning its analysis with its deferential standard. 25'
Defining a two-step order of analysis would make review of an
agency's application of its regulations more like judicial review of an
agency's interpretation of a statute. The change would also emphasize
the significance of the status of a regulation as law, to which a court must
defer under Chevron, and which binds an agency until the agency
amends that law by conforming to the informal rule making process
prescribed by § 553 of the APA.252 Just as with a statute, if a regulation
is clear in its requirements as determined by a court, that clear law binds
the agency. A newly defined first step when a court reviews an agency's
interpretation of its regulations would encourage attention to the method
or methods for interpreting regulations.25 3
248. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,414 (1945).
249. The lack of this step-one inquiry may explain why there has not been a coherent body of
law relating to the proper interpretation of regulations. See Stack, supra note 6, at 368 ("The dearth
of doctrine addressing regulatory interpretation under Chevron can be partially explained by the
well-established doctrine, attributed to Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. and Auer v. Robbins,
that an agency's construction of its own regulation is controlling unless plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation." (footnote omitted) (quotation marks omitted)).
250. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
251. See supra text following note 84.
252. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). Or, in very rare cases, the agency conforms with formal rule making
requirements. See id. §§ 556-557.
253. Justice Scalia has, unsurprisingly, advocated a textualist approach to such interpretations.
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Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Decker, contends that a court should
simply construe an agency's regulation based only on its text, neither
according deference to the agency nor considering the advisability of the
agency's interpretation.2 54 Because Justice Scalia has now concluded
that proper Auer deference is not permissible given the insurmountable
separation of powers concerns, he appears to have concluded that it does
not matter whether the court-determined meaning is clear or the best
reading of an ambiguous regulation.255
As discussed in the next section, this article advocates Skidmore
review when a court interprets an ambiguous regulation. The approach
presented in the next section locates the interpretive power in the court
and thereby accounts for, inter alia, the separation of powers concern.
The proposed approach, however, retains a role for the agency, which
may seek to persuade the court that its interpretation should be adopted
by the court as the best interpretation. Because the court wields
interpretive authority at both of the proposed steps of review, dividing
review into two steps has far less significance than in a case in which
proper Chevron deference applies.256 Notwithstanding this diminished
See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1342 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("I would therefore resolve these cases by using the familiar tools of textual
interpretation to decide."). Justice Scalia specifically rejected an interpretative approach that would
account for the agency's intent. See id. at 1340 ("There is true of regulations what is true of statutes.
As Justice Holmes put it: '[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the
statute means.' Whether governing rules are made by the national legislature or an administrative
agency, we are bound by what they say, not by the unexpressed intention of those who made them."
(alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal
Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REv. 417, 419 (1899))).
Professor Stack has presented a forceful argument in favor of a purposivist approach to
interpretation, relying on how notice and comment rule making defines the content of law. See
generally Stack, supra note 6. Notwithstanding the strong views stated by Justice Scalia, the Court
has on at least one occasion suggested that, when interpreting a regulation, the agency's intent is
properly considered. See Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988); ef Manning, supra note
6, at 690 ("In a Skidmore regime, if the Court looked to statements of basis and purpose for evidence
of the linguistic and cultural environment in which a regulation was adopted, agencies would
presumably respond by tailoring such statements to that application. If so, the resulting explanations
of agency regulations would simultaneously enhance the clarity of agency decisionmaking and the
accuracy ofjudicial review." (footnotes omitted)).
254. See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1342 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
255. Brand X, of course, makes this distinction important when an agency has interpreted a
statute but has not acted in the exercise of delegated lawmaking power. See Nat'l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005). In that context, an agency
could change the court's interpretation if the statute were ambiguous and the agency exercised its
delegated lawmaking power and adopted an alternate interpretation that was not clearly barred by the
statute (under step one of the Chevron analysis). See id. at 982-83, 985.
256. It is very important to pursue the first step of Chevron analysis at the outset of a court's
review of an agency's interpretation of a statute. When an agency interprets a statute and the statute
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importance of the two-step approach, the approach remains helpful in
administrative law because substantial legal significance attaches to
whether applicable law is clear or ambiguous.
Adopting a two-step approach would be a notable, although
principally cosmetic, change. The question of true controversy is the
standard for judicial review of an agency's interpretation of an
ambiguous regulation. This is the question that we will now address.
B. Apply Skidmore Review to an Agency Interpretationofan
Ambiguous Regulation
The Supreme Court's decisions regarding Auer deference in the
years since Mead show a Court that is unsure about the content of a
proper standard, as well as how such a standard fits into the body of
administrative law. The Court should now abandon the line of cases
applying Auer deference and christen a new review standard when an
agency interprets an ambiguous regulation. This new review standard
would be equivalent to Skidmore review and would permit the agency to
seek to convince the court that its interpretation should be adopted-that
its interpretation is the best, rather than merely a permissible
interpretation.257 Interpretive authority would, however, be definitively
and critically located in the court. If this proposed standard of review
were adopted, the new standard would apply in every case in which an
agency has interpreted its own ambiguous regulations.25 8 This part of the
article will present the multiple compelling arguments supporting this
new standard of review.

is clear in barring the agency's interpretation, there is no need to engage in the Mead analysis to
determine whether Chevron deference or Skidmore review applies. See Healy, supra note 1, at 3942. Moreover, if the statute is clear, then the agency does not have the authority under BrandX to
adopt its preferred interpretation through an exercise of delegated lawmaking power. See BrandX,
545 U.S. at 982-83.
257. This is the same standard advocated by Professor Manning. See Manning, supra note 6, at
681 ("[T]he Court should modify Seminole Rock by embracing the approach of Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., which adopts a standard of review that accounts for agency expertise and experience when
Congress has not delegated interpretive lawmaking authority under statutes. In that context, the
Court has explained, an agency's interpretation does not bind a reviewing court." (footnotes
omitted)).
258. Professors Stephenson and Pogoriler suggest other limitations on the applicability of Auer
deference. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 19, at 1493-94.
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1. Separation of Powers
The constitutional separation of powers strongly supports a standard
of review that requires the court itself to interpret the regulations
promulgated by the agency. As Montesquieu long-ago argued 259 and as
Justice Scalia much more recently opined,260 the making of law must be
separated from the application of law. 2 61 The lawmaker and the law
applier must not be one and the same. A regulation, of course,
constitutes the making of law, while the interpretation of that law is an
application of it. An independent actor, here a court, must have authority
to review the application of agency-made law independently. 262
Chevron/Auer deference does not permit that independent substantive
review, 263 while Skidmore review does. 2 64 The Skidmore-review regime
259. See MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS bk. 11, ch. 6, 151-52 (0. Piest ed., T. Nugent
trans. 1949), quoted in Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1341 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
concurnng in part and dissenting in part) ("When the legislative and executive powers are united in
the same person ... there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch
or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.").
260. See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1341 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he
power to prescribe is augmented by the power to interpret; and the incentive is to speak vaguely and
broadly, so as to retain a 'flexibility' that will enable 'clarification' with retroactive effect."); see
also id. ("Auer is not a logical corollary to Chevron but a dangerous permission slip for the
arrogation of power." (citation omitted)). Justice Scalia explained that Chevron deference does not
give rise to the problem of Auer deference. See id. ("Congress cannot enlarge its own power
through Chevron-whatever it leaves vague in the statute will be worked out by someone else.
Chevron represents a presumption about who, as between the Executive and the Judiciary, that
someone else will be. (The Executive, by the way-the competing political branch-is the less
congenial repository of the power as far as Congress is concerned.) So Congress's incentive is to
speak as clearly as possible on the matters it regards as important.").
261. See Manning, supra note 6, at 646-47 (discussing John Locke's strong argument that
lawmaking had to be separated from law execution). Professor Manning's article presented the
early, cogent case that Auer deference conflicts with the separation of powers. This case is more
recently presented in Aneil Kovvali, Note, Seminole Rock and the Separationof Powers, 36 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 849 (2013).
262. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 19, at 1460 ("[A] crucial difference between
Chevron and Seminole Rock is that the former preserves a separation of legislative and interpretive
power, whereas the latter allows these powers to be combined in a single entity. Even though
Chevron involves a shift of interpretive power from the judiciary to an agency, the agency has the
power to construe a text that was enacted by Congress. By contrast, Seminole Rock allows the
agency to act as the primary interpreter of regulations that the agency itself promulgated." (footnote
omitted)); See Stack, supra note 6, at 410 ("When a court defers to an agency's construction of its
own regulation under Seminole Rock, it permits the agency to consolidate lawmaking and lawinterpreting functions. At a practical level, the doctrine creates incentives for the agency to issue
broad and vague regulations and to specify their meaning later, subject only to plainly erroneous
review, undermining rule-of-law values of fair notice." (footnotes omitted)).
263. See Manning, supra note 6, at 631 ("By permitting agencies both to write regulations and to
construe them authoritatively, Seminole Rock effectively unifies lawmaking and law-exposition-a
combination of powers decisively rejected by our constitutional structure.").
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does permit a court to account for agency experience and expertise by
allowing the agency to explain and advocate for its interpretation. The
court may account for the agency position to the extent that position is
persuasive. The court will not, however, be bound by the agency, and
will, instead, make its own substantive decision.
One famous analogy for understanding separation of powers was
employed by the seventeenth century English writer, James
Harrington. 265 Harrington wrote that, when considering the sharing of a
cake between parties, the person who divides the cake must not be the
person who chooses the desired piece of cake if there is to be a fair
sharing.2 66 The dividing of the cake analogy is important, because
abandoning Auer deference forecloses an agency from being able to
make law (divide the cake) in a way that the agency itself can later apply
unfairly (distributing the pieces).267
Although not directly articulated by the Court, this concern might
have animated the Court's decision in SmithKline.2 68 There, the Court
declined to accord proper deference to the agency's interpretation
This approach, which
because that interpretation had changed.
substantially reduces an agency's opportunity to surprise unfairly a
regulated party by a changed interpretation of an ambiguous
regulation, 269 does not, however, sufficiently limit the agency's law
application power in the face of an ambiguous law the agency itself has
made. The regulation at issue in SmithKline was sufficiently ambiguous
264. See id. at 617 ("[T]he Court should replace Seminole Rock with a standard that imposes an
independent judicial check on the agency's determination of regulatory meaning."); id. at 683 ("[I]f
a court is not bound by an agency's interpretation of its own regulations, but must independently
determine their meaning, then the constitutional fail-safe of having multiple actors performs its vital
function.").
265. JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA (1656), reprintedin CAMBRIDGE
TEXTS IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 22, 24 (James G. Pocock ed., 1992).

266. See id. at 24 ("[I]f she that divided must have chosen also, it had been little worse for the
other, in case she had not divided at all, but kept the whole cake unto herself, in regard that being to
choose too, she divided accordingly.").
267. Harrington argues accordingly that the power to make law needs to be independent of the
power to apply law. See id
268. 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2167 (2012).
269. An agency's changed interpretation of a statute does not give rise to the same concern about
unfair surprise when Chevron deference applies under the Mead analysis. A change in the
interpretation of a statute that follows rule making would provide notice to affected parties and
would typically apply only prospectively. A change in the interpretation of a statute that followed a
formal adjudication would be determined only after on-the-record procedures that ensured an
adequate hearing that would allow for the consideration of the impact of a changed interpretation on
a party to the adjudication. Moreover, the law being interpreted (the statute) would not have been
written by the body deciding how to apply the law.
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to permit a conclusion that a large class of workers either was or was not
subject to a statute that imposed a significant financial burden. If a
regulation has that degree of ambiguity, then the agency should not have
the power to choose the substantive interpretation, regardless of whether
that interpretation is the agency's initial interpretation of the regulation
or a subsequent changed interpretation. 2 70 The agency's application of
the ambiguous law conflicts with the separation of powers, regardless of
whether that application is a changed or a consistent interpretation.
Justice Scalia, it should be recognized, has been strongly critical of
the Skidmore standard for reviewing agency interpretations of law. One
of the several matters that he bemoaned in his impassioned dissent in
Mead was the majority's "breathing new life into the anachronism of
Skidmore."271 He opined that "the rule of Skidmore deference is an
empty truism and a trifling statement of the obvious: A judge should take
into account the well-considered views of expert observers." 272 He also
viewed the use of the standard as "a recipe for uncertainty,
unpredictability, and endless litigation. To condemn a vast body of
agency action to that regime . . . is irresponsible."273 In short, Justice
Scalia views Skidmore review as nothing more than "that test most
beloved by a court unwilling to be held to rules (and most feared by
270. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 19, at 1453 ("[B]road judicial deference to an
agency's interpretation of its own regulations may enable an agency to enact binding rules without
subjecting itself either to meaningful procedural safeguards or to rigorous judicial scrutiny."). These
authors described the contrasting incentives that Chevron-style deference creates for the bodies
writing the law:
Congress knows (or should know) that when it leaves gaps, conflicts, or ambiguities in a
statute, those ambiguities will be resolved by some other entity-either an administrative
agency (under Chevron) or a court (if no agency administers the statute, or if Chevron
does not apply). This gives Congress an incentive to write clearer statutes, lest another
institution-perhaps a political rival-acquire control over the statute's meaning. This
does not mean that Congress will always write statutes as clearly as possible: specificity
must be weighed against other values, which is why Congress often delegates authority in
the first place. But at least this consideration imposes a countervailing constraint. By
contrast, under Seminole Rock, an administrative agency that writes vague regulations
knows that it will be able to control their subsequent interpretation. Regulatory
ambiguity, unlike statutory ambiguity, does not entail an implicit delegation to another
institution, which makes such ambiguity relatively more attractive. This, in turn, leads
both to regulatory unpredictability and concerns about arbitrariness.
Id. at 1461 (footnotes omitted); see also Manning, supra note 6, at 662 ("[T]he power of selfinterpretation under Seminole Rock reduces the efficacy of notice-and-comment rule making. In
particular, it permits the agency to promulgate imprecise or vague rules and to settle upon or reveal
their actual meaning only when the agency implements its rule through adjudication.").
271. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
272. Id.
273. Id.
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litigants who want to know what to expect): th' ol' 'totality of the
circumstances' test." 274
Justice Scalia's condemnation of this review regime does not address
the core of its significance, which is that the court itself has the authority
to construe the legal source. Assuming that the court does properly
exercise this interpretive authority-an assumption that Justice Scalia
rejects in the Mead context but now accepts in the Auer context-the
court ought to account for the expert views of the agency as the court
comes to its own conclusion about the proper interpretation. Viewed in
this light, Skidmore review is not a totality of the circumstances test, it is
rather a proper accounting of the agency's experience and expertise by
the judiciary.2 75
Redefining the standard of review to preclude proper deference is
also consistent with the Court's long-standing view that Congress has the
authority to define standards of review (and deference) when an agency
action is challenged in court.276 Indeed, in its two most important
modem standard of review decisions, Chevron and Mead, the Court has
grounded its decision in the inferred intent of Congress. Chevron
inferred that Congress intended that courts would defer to an agency's
interpretation of an ambiguous statute, regardless of whether the
ambiguity was intended or the result of inadvertence.277 Mead thereafter
limited the scope of application of Chevron deference, because the Court
inferred that Congress intended for courts to defer to an agency's
interpretation of a statute only when the agency had acted to make law
pursuant to a congressional delegation of lawmaking power.278
Courts have long interpreted statutes to avoid a constitutional
question unless compelled by clear language or intent. 2 79 The Court has
applied this rule to limit the scope of authority that an ambiguous statute

274. Id. at 241.
275. See Manning, supra note 6, at 681 ("[A]n agency's interpretation of its own regulations, if
not binding upon a reviewing court, retains value as a tool of construction. Congress's decision to
commit lawmaking power to agencies vests substantial regulatory authority in specialized bodies
with knowledge, expertise, and experience that generalist courts lack. Agencies may therefore have
insights into regulatory history, context, or purpose that may not be readily apparent to even the most
seasoned federal judge.").
276. See, e.g., Mead, 533 U.S. at 221; Healy, supra note 1, at 21.
277. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)
(quoted supra note 110).
278. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
279. See, e.g., Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 505-07
(1979).
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may otherwise have delegated to an administrative agency. 280 Because
delegating the power to interpret a regulation and then applying it against
a regulated party raises such a fundamental separation of powers
concern, a court should hold that Congress has not intended to delegate
such power to an agency (in the absence of clear intent or text).281 In
short, inferring legislative intent, as the Court has notably done when
determining the proper standard of review, would confirm the conclusion
that a deferential, Chevron-like review standard has no applicability to a
court's review of an agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous
regulation.
There is, to be sure, one administrative context in which recent
Supreme Court precedent creates a tension with the position that a court
must exercise interpretive authority when reviewing an agency
interpretation of a regulation. Should a court properly defer when an
ambiguous regulation is interpreted by an agency in a formal
adjudication? 282 When an agency interprets a statute in a formal
adjudication, the Mead analysis would indicate that Chevron deference
applies, provided that Congress had delegated lawmaking power to the
agency.283 When an agency is interpreting its own regulations in a
formal adjudication, the agency is making law by applying the same law
that the agency has previously defined. The fact that the application of
the law occurs in a proceeding that provides greater procedural
protections for the affected party does not change the fact that the agency
is engaged in the application of law that the agency has made. Only
Skidmore review should properly apply in this case because the
separation of powers concerns about an agency applying agency-made
law trump deference to an agency making law pursuant to a
congressional delegation.284 Nevertheless, a court may, when reviewing
280. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S.
159, 172-73 (2001) ("This requirement stems from our prudential desire not to needlessly reach
constitutional issues and our assumption that Congress does not casually authorize administrative
agencies to interpret a statute to push the limit of congressional authority.").
281. Cf Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1341 (2013) (Scalia, J. concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("While the implication of an agency power to clarify the statute is
reasonable enough, there is surely no congressional implication that the agency can resolve
ambiguities in its own regulations. For that would violate a fundamental principle of separation of
powers-that the power to write a law and the power to interpret it cannot rest in the same hands.").
282. Professors Stephenson and Pogoriler present the argument that such proper deference is
appropriate in this context. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 19, at 1486.
283. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230-31.
284. There is tension regarding the inferred intent of Congress relating to the deference, if any,
owed to an agency: proper deference when a statute is interpreted in a formal adjudication, while
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an interpretation of regulations in a formal adjudication, conclude that
the record presented by the agency has great persuasive value that
supports the interpretation advocated by the agency.285 The court,
however, will properly retain the power to decide how the law defined in
the regulation should be applied.
2. The APA
In addition to this strong constitutional argument for abandoning
traditional Auer deference, there is a strong statutory argument for an
independent interpretive role for courts in this context. It is surprising
that the Supreme Court has generally ignored the terms of the APA while
shaping the rules of deference to administrative agencies 286 despite that
statute's significance for the structure of administrative law.2 87
Moreover, the Court has broadly declared that Congress has the authority
to define the degree of deference to agency determinations. 288 Indeed,
the Court has engaged in the complex imputation of intent to Congress as
it has developed the modem law of deference to agencies.28 ' The Court
may have benefitted from directly considering the requirements of the
APA when shaping the law of deference to agency interpretations of
regulations.
Most importantly, the APA imposes significant procedural
requirements on both formal 290 and informal 291 rule making. The
Skidmore review is applied when the agency interprets a regulation in the formal adjudication. The
tension is resolved, however, because a serious constitutional problem is presented when a court
properly defers to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation.
285. Cf Manning, supra note 6, at 686 ("[A]gencies may possess special experience and
expertise that can assist a reviewing court in reaching its own conclusions about meaning." (footnote
omitted)).
286. See supra note 75 and accompanying text; cf Manning, supranote 6, at 636 ("[C]ourts have
not treated the open-ended judicial review provisions of the APA and analogous statutes as firm
expressions of legislative direction. Rather, the courts often appear to draw upon their own
sensibilities in giving content to such provisions.").
287. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 216 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I write
separately because I find it incomplete to discuss general principles of administrative law without
reference to the basic structural legislation which is the embodiment of those principles, the
Administrative Procedure Act .... ); see also Strauss, "Deference " Is Too Confusing, supra note
76, at 1149 ("Agencies must be subject to judicial controls that reach into their assessment of factual
and law-applying issues, that is, not to displace their responsibilities, but to assure their responsible,
rational exercise. In 1946, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) would embody this change.").
288. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 221.
289. See, e.g., supra notes 276-78 and accompanying text.
290. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (2012); see also § 553(c) (defining when formal rule making
requirements apply).
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rejection of Auer deference and adoption of Skidmore review would
prevent an agency from interpreting its regulations, rather than amending
its regulations in compliance with APA procedural requirements, and
receiving judicial acceptance of the interpretation absent an actual
conflict with the content of the regulations.292 The proposed approach
would encourage agencies to define regulations as clearly as possible to
avoid leaving the interpretive question to a reviewing court that will
consider, but will not be bound by, the agency's interpretation. 293 Such
an approach would be analogous to the rule of reduced deference when
an agency interprets a statute by issuing an interpretive rule without
complying with the procedural requirements for legislative rules imposed
by § 553.294
This statutory rationale reinforces the separation of powers concern,
which is greatest when the agency's regulations provide broad discretion
to the agency regarding the application of the regulations. Justice Scalia,
when he condemned the Court's decision in Mead, argued that one
consequence of the decision would be that agencies would be encouraged
to regulate in broad terms so that they could then rely upon Auer
291. Id. § 553.
292. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 19, at 1461 ("Seminole Rock could enable agencies
to adopt legally binding norms without either the ex ante constraint of meaningful procedural
safeguards or the ex post check of rigorous judicial review."); id at 1467 ("[A] serious concern
about unqualified Seminole Rock deference is that, when coupled with the interpretive rule
exemption from notice-and-comment procedures, agencies can evade the 'pay me now or pay me
later' structure of the doctrine by promulgating placeholder legislative rules that nominally go
through notice and comment, but do not resolve key questions; the agency does the actual
policymaking work by issuing interpretive rules that purport to interpret the placeholder rule, and by
claiming both Seminole Rock deference and an exemption from notice and comment for these
interpretive pronouncements.").
293. See Manning, supra note 6, at 655 ("The right of self-interpretation under Seminole Rock
removes an important affirmative reason for the agency to express itself clearly; since the agency
can say what its own regulations mean (unless the agency's view is plainly erroneous), the agency
bears little, if any, risk of its own opacity or imprecision."); id. at 617 (Judicial deference to an
agency's reasonable interpretation of its regulations "makes it that much less likely that an agency
will give clear notice of its policies either to those who participate in the rule making process
prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or to the regulated public."). Professor
Manning also described additional benefits of a legal regime that incentivizes clearer rule making by
agencies. See id at 680 ("[B]y encouraging agencies to write more straightforward and less
malleable regulations, abandonment of Seminole Rock deference would help to give agencies some
insulation from the influence of concentrated interest groups working through their favorite
legislators or committees."); id. ("Regulatory opacity, quite simply, makes it harder for the public to
monitor agency decisionmaking, and leaves the agency more vulnerable to the influence of relatively
narrow interest groups. As a doctrine designed to promote the political accountability of
administrative decisionmaking, Seminole Rock is, at best, a mixed bag.").
294. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 232 (2001) ("[l]nterpretive rules ... enjoy
no Chevron status as a class."); Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995).
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deference and avoid the less deferential review of the agency's
interpretation of a statute that might result from Mead analysis.295
Abandoning Auer deference eliminates any such agency incentive: Under
the proposed review standard, a broadly written regulation would not
augment agency discretion, but would instead transfer interpretive
authority to the courts, which would have the power to interpret the
agency's ambiguous regulation.296
3. A More Consistent Regime of Deference
The rejection of Auer deference would also have the practical
advantage of identifying a more consistent regime of deference rules.
The review of agency interpretations of regulations has always been
subject to the expected requirement that an interpretation must not
conflict with the regulations.2 97 Such a conflicting interpretation would
have the effect of amending the regulation and would be permitted only
if the regulation were itself amended through notice and comment rule
making. The regulation itself thus had to be ambiguous with regard to
the agency's interpretation in order to be subject to deferential review.
This long-standing analysis is analogous to step one of the Chevron
analysis, which inquires whether the statute itself bars the agency
interpretation. This traditional limit on the interpretation of regulations
would remain and be emphasized by the new first step of review of an
agency's interpretation of regulations.29 8 The new rule of deference will
apply only when the regulation is ambiguous with regard to the issue
being decided by the agency.
The application of Skidmore review to ambiguous regulations fits
with the result of the Mead analysis. Chevron deference is not typically
owed when an agency adjudicates informally, a principal context for the
application of regulations, many of which will be ambiguous as to the
matter being determined. Mead views formal adjudication as the making
of law, for which Chevron deference is appropriate.299 It is notable that
Justice Scalia roundly criticized the Mead decision and the limitations
295. Mead, 533 U.S. at 246 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
296. See Manning, supra note 6, at 647 ("[S]eparation of lawmaking from law-exposition also
limits arbitrary government by providing legislators an incentive to enact rules that impose clear and
definite limits upon governmental authority, rather than adopting vague and discretionary grants of
power." (footnote omitted)).
297. See Accardi, discussed supra at notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
298. See supra Part W.A.
299. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230-31.
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that it established for Chevron deference.300 In the Auer context,
however, Justice Scalia has found his way to a similar limitation in the
context of agency interpretations of regulations, this time by way of
separation of powers. 3 0 1 The resulting standard of review appears quite
similar. Agency interpretations of regulations will most typically occur
in an informal adjudication. It seems odd to conclude, under the Mead
analysis, that Chevron deference is not generally owed in this broad
range of cases and then, nevertheless, apply that same level of deference
under the Auer rubric, when an agency is applying a regulation in the
302
informal adjudication.
The Court seemed to recognize this oddity
when it decided Coeur Alaska and treated Auer deference as the
equivalent of Skidmore review after having concluded that the agency's
interpretation was not owed Chevron deference.30 3
Abandoning Auer deference will also ensure that every interpretive
rule will be subject to the same Skidmore review standard. An agency
may issue an interpretive rule to interpret either a statute or a regulation.
The APA provides that an interpretive rule may be issued without
complying with the APA procedural requirements for rule making. 30
Mead confirmed that an agency would not receive Chevron deference for
an interpretive rule that interpreted a statute.30 s Chevron deference does
not apply because the agency does not exercise delegated lawmaking
power when it issues an interpretive rule. If, however, an agency were to
issue an interpretive rule that interprets an ambiguous regulation, Auer
deference would apply unless one of the Court's newly defined limits
applied.
A deference regime that permits this inconsistent treatment of
interpretive rules is quite problematic. Reshaping the review standard to
remove proper deference for an agency interpretation of a regulation will
eliminate the inconsistency and foreclose an agency's ability to receive
proper Chevron-like deference when an agency simply announces its
300. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
301. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1341 (2013) (Scalia, J. concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
302. See Stack, supra note 6, at 411 (presenting a "proposal" that "corrects the incentives created
by current doctrine, which generally denies Chevron deference to informal agency interpretations,
such as those in agency litigation briefs, but grants deference under Seminole Rock to agency
interpretations in briefs" (footnote omitted)).
303. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 283-84 (2009).
304. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012).
305. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 232 (2001); see also Shalala v. Guernsey
Mem'I Hosp., 514 U.S. 87,99 (1995).
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interpretation of an ambiguous regulation.
4. A Proper Consideration of the Source of Law
The proposed standard of review for an agency's interpretation of its
own regulations also properly accounts for the source of law. We have
discussed the central significance of source of law to the rules of
deference for judicial review of agency legal interpretations. 30 Under
Mead, proper Chevron deference is owed when the agency is the source
of law, while Skidmore review applies when Congress is the source of
the law. The fact that the agency is the source of law in the context of an
interpretation of its own regulations pulls in different directions. The
Mead analysis resulted in a strong rule of deference when the agency,
rather than Congress, is the source of the law. That deference followed
from the fact that, by enacting a statute ambiguous with regard to the
legal issue resolved by the agency, Congress intended for the agency to
have delegated authority to interpret the law. Accordingly, when an
agency exercises delegated lawmaking authority, a court must defer to
that agency-made law, rather than substitute its own view of a preferred
interpretation. The Montesquieu separation of powers principles, as we
have seen, weigh in favor of barring agency law-applying power, when
the agency has also made the law.307 This is because the agency, when
interpreting its own regulations, is engaged in a second order of
lawmaking-it is applying the law that the agency itself has made and
there is a need for independent review.
5. Consistency with Basic Administrative Law Principles
Allowing independent judicial review in this context, subject of
course to the agency's ability to persuade but not to control, does not
undercut the basic regime of administrative law. If a court were to be
unpersuaded by an agency and interpret a regulation in a way that
conflicted with the agency's interpretation, the agency would continue to
have retained lawmaking authority to alter the legal rule adopted by the
court.308 If statutory ambiguity permits the agency's preferred, but
306. See supranotes 132-33 and accompanying text.
307. See supranotes 259-67 and accompanying text.
308. Justice Scalia made this point in his opinion in Decker. He wrote:
It is true enough that Auer deference has the same beneficial pragmatic effect as Chevron
deference: The country need not endure the uncertainty produced by divergent views of
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rejected, interpretation, the agency would retain the power to amend its
regulations by employing the necessary procedures under § 553.309 The
amended regulation, containing the preferred agency position, would
then receive Chevron deference when reviewed in court and its substance
would be accepted by a court, unless that substance were barred by the
statute. In that case of a conflict with the statute, Congress would itself
have defined the applicable legal rule. This ability of the agency to
change the interpretation of the regulation would be analogous to the
agency's ability, recognized in Brand X, to change a court's
interpretation of an ambiguous statute, by exercising its delegated
lawmaking power.31 o Such a revised agency regulation incorporating its
preferred interpretation would, of course, constitute the agency's making
of law, informed by notice and comment, rather than the agency
interpretation of the law defined in regulations that the agency itself also
made.
This proposed standard of review would also result in the same
standard of review for an agency's interpretation of its regulations as for
an agency's interpretation of a statute when the agency has not acted in
the exercise of delegated lawmaking power. An interpretive rule would
then be reviewed under the same standard, regardless of whether that

numerous district courts and courts of appeals as to what is the fairest reading of the
regulation, until a definitive answer is finally provided, years later, by this Court. The
agency's view can be relied upon, unless it is, so to speak, beyond the pale. But the
duration of the uncertainty produced by a vague regulation need not be as long as the
uncertainty produced by a vague statute. For as soon as an interpretation uncongenial to
the agency is pronounced by a district court, the agency can begin the process of
amending the regulation to make its meaning entirely clear. The circumstances of this
case demonstrate the point. While these cases were being briefed before us, EPA issued
a rule designed to respond to the Court of Appeals judgment we are reviewing. It did so
(by the standards of such things) relatively quickly: The decision below was handed
down in May 2011, and in December 2012 the EPA published an amended rule setting
forth in unmistakable terms the position it argues here ....
Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1341-42 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
309. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); cf Stack, supra note 6, at 415 ("If an agency (or a president) seeks
to change policy that would be inconsistent with the prior rule and its statement, the agency has the
capacity to do so by conducting a new rulemaking proceeding. To be sure, a notice-and-comment
rulemaking can consume a great deal of agency resources. But it still requires the coordination of
fewer parties with disparate interest than does legislation, and can be undertaken at the agency's
initiative, unlike most shifts in judicial doctrine. If the need for flexibility is truly pressing, the APA
gives the agency leeway to issue new rules outside of notice-and-comment procedure. This provides
a suitable escape valve where the needs for flexibility are at their height." (footnotes omitted)).
310. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-83
(2005).
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interpretive rule interpreted the statute, regulations, or both.3 11
6. Retention of Functionalism
Establishing a new non-deferential standard of review would be
motivated by reasons that are formal in nature, namely the separation of
powers. Functionalism rather than formalism has, as we have seen, been
at the center of the Court's explanation of Seminole Rock deference
through its post-Chevron acceptance as Auer deference.312 The proposed
standard of review does not abandon functionalism. Skidmore review
retains functionalism, because it accounts for the agency's experience
and expertise in its consideration of the agency's reasons for its
interpretation.31 The agency's reasons for the interpretation, if they are
persuasive because they are grounded in expertise and experience, may
provide strong support for the interpretation and would accordingly be
persuasive to a court, especially because the regulations have been
determined to be ambiguous. In assessing the persuasiveness of the
agency's position, a court would also be well-advised to consider its own
functional limitations when the court resolves the question of
administrative law. 3 14 These functional limits may prompt a court to be
more willing to accept the agency's position as its own. 315 The court, of
311. To be sure, the standard of review that this article proposes does create a tension regarding
the proper standard of review when an agency's interpretation is made in a formal adjudication. See
supra notes 282-85 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 50-53, 107 and accompanying text. Cf Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra
note 19, at 1490 ("[A] doctrinal limit on Seminole Rock's domain, then, would mean that Skidmore
(or de novo review) would replace Seminole Rock as the governing standard of review in some
regulatory policy areas. That result would be undesirable to the extent that it sacrifices the virtues
associated with Seminole Rock-expertise, accountability, flexibility, and the like.").
313. Professor Strauss has emphasized that, when it applies the Skidmore regime, a court
properly accounts for the agency's experience and expertise. See Strauss, "Deference " Is Too
Confusing, supra note 76, at 1156 ("What is 'exclusively a judicial function' does not exclude
agency views. Once a question of statutory interpretation has been put before a court, it is for the
court to resolve the question of meaning. Among the matters indispensable for it to consider,
however, are the meanings attributed to it by prior (administrative) interpreters, their stability, and
the possibly superior body of information and more embracive responsibilities that underlay them.
They may be entitled to great 'weight' on the judicial scales.").
314. See Strauss, "Deference" Is Too Confusing, supra note 76, at 1146 ("It is not only that
agencies have the credibility of their circumstances, but also that they can contribute to an efficient,
predictable, and nationally uniform understanding of the law that would be disrupted by the variable
results to be expected from a geographically and politically diverse judiciary encountering the
hardest (that is to say, the most likely to be litigated) issues with little experience with the overall
scheme and its patterns.").
315. See Manning, supra note 6, at 688-89 ("Skidmore thus recognizes that an expert agency
may be better positioned than a generalist court to understand and explain the specialized way in

692

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

course, would hold the ultimate interpretive power.
The Court recently highlighted this distinction between a court
giving weight to the views of another governmental body and a court
being bound by that body's views. In Fisher v. University of Texas at
Austin,16 the Court considered the contention of the state university that
it had complied with the requirements of strict scrutiny in its use of an
affirmative action plan for the admission of a racially diverse student
body. The Court held that, when a court applies the strict scrutiny test,
the court may properly account for the university's experience, but the
court itself must decide whether the test has been met:
Once the University has established that its goal of diversity is
consistent with strict scrutiny, however, there must still be a further
judicial determination that the admissions process meets strict scrutiny
in its implementation. The University must prove that the means
chosen by the University to attain diversity are narrowly tailored to that
goal. On this point, the University receives no deference. Grutter
made clear that it is for the courts, not for university administrators, to
ensure that 'the means chosen to accomplish the government's asserted
purpose must be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that
purpose.' True, a court can take account of a university's experience
and expertise in adopting or rejecting certain admissions processes.
But, as the Court said in Grutter,it remains at all times the University's
obligation to demonstrate, and the Judiciary's obligation to determine,
that admissions processes 'ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an
individual and not in a way that makes an aplicant's race or ethnicity
the defining feature of his or her application.'
When a court reviews an agency's interpretation of a regulation, the
court must itself determine the proper interpretation, although the court
ought to consider the agency's expert views when the court makes its
decision. If a court were not persuaded by the agency's expertise and
experience, the agency would retain the authority to amend its
regulations to reflect the agency's experience-based interpretation of the
If the amended regulation were then
statute by rule making. t
challenged, the agency would receive Chevron deference for the new
regulation. Chevron deference applies notwithstanding the agency's

which a regulatory community uses and understands its terms of art. It reminds courts that
regulations often incorporate legal technicalities, and that a court should be open to an agency's
expert testimony that particular terms were not used in the layperson's sense.").
316. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
317. Id. at 2419-20 (citations omitted).
318. See supra notes 308-10 and accompanying text.
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change in position.m
V. CONCLUSION

For many years, courts have employed a very deferential standard of
review when reviewing an agency's interpretation of its own regulations.
Although this review standard has been widely accepted and applied, the
Court has provided little theoretical support for the standard.
The Supreme Court has reshaped the law of judicial review of
agency interpretations of statutes, most recently in Mead. Mead's effect
has now begun to be felt when the Court reviews an agency's
interpretation of its own regulations. This article has argued that the
Court should take advantage of this time of uncertainty in the law to end
the Auer/Seminole Rock line of cases.
The Court should establish a new standard of review that considers
first whether the regulation is clear and applies any such clear regulatory
requirement. If the regulation is ambiguous, the court would apply a
standard of review that is analogous to Skidmore review by which the
court itself has the power to interpret the ambiguous regulation. Under
this regime, an agency would not bind a court by its interpretation, but
would have an opportunity to convince the court to adopt the agency's
interpretation, informed as it may be by the agency's experience and
expertise. The Court should make it clear that, when this new standard
of review is employed, the court, rather than the agency, wields the
interpretive power. The court should properly be the decider in this
context. That role is consistent with the Constitution, the APA, and the
structure of administrative law.

319. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981-82
(2005). The agency's change in position would be considered in deciding whether the agency was
arbitrary or capricious in promulgating the amended regulation. See Healy, supra note 1, at 50-51.

